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Abstract 
This dissertation addresses the paradoxical relationship between religion and racism. 
Specifically, this study combines elements of terror management theory (TMT) and 
the dissociation model to examine the potential impact of intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, 
indiscriminate, and low religiosity on questions of race and death anxiety. Past 
research provides conflicting evidence concerning the ability of intrinsic religiosity to 
reduce racial tendencies. The negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity and 
prejudice has been questioned in light of social desirability concerns. The dissociation 
model suggests social desirability does not necessarily indicate lack of genuine 
concern for prejudice reduction. Measuring compunction (guilt/shame) in light of a 
participant’s self-reported violation of non-prejudiced beliefs (should , would, and 
discrepancy scores) provides a means to examine the degree to which non-prejudiced 
values are actually held. Likewise, self-reported discrepancies represent violations of 
a person’s cultural worldview and, according to TMT, result in increased death 
anxiety. Using a series of correlations, ANOVA’s and ANCOVA’s this dissertation 
found support for central elements of TMT. Increased discrepancy scores were found 
to be positively correlated with death anxiety. Discrepancy scores were also found to 
be negatively correlated with social desirability.  Results also suggest intrinsic, 
extrinsic, and quest religiosity function similarly in relation to racism.   
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
In a 1963 question and answer session following his speech to Western 
Michigan University, Martin Luther King observed:  
I must admit that I have gone through those moments when I was greatly 
disappointed with the church and what it has done in this period of social 
change. We must face the fact that in America, the church is still the most 
segregated major institution… At 11:00 on Sunday morning when we stand 
and sing and Christ has no east or west, we stand at the most segregated hour 
in this nation. This is tragic (King, 1963, p. 22).  
As the “moral guardian of the community”, King believed the church had the 
responsibility to, “preach brotherhood and make it a reality within its own body” 
(1963, p. 11). It was not just the church of King’s time that struggled to meet this 
responsibility; the conflict continues to play out to the present day across the broader 
scope of Judeo Christian tradition.  
Universal compassion is a defining element of Judeo, Christian, and Muslim 
faiths. “Love your neighbor as yourself” is contained in Jewish scripture (Lev. 19:18) 
and echoed in Christian scripture (Mt. 19:19; Mk. 12:31; Lk. 10:27). The Koran calls 
followers to be “kind to your parents, relatives, orphans, the destitute, your near and 
distant neighbors” (Sura 4:16). Despite such calls, prejudice remains a great 
challenge. Jewish scripture contains the story of Jonah, an ethnocentric, prejudiced 
prophet who refuses to travel to the city of Nineveh even complaining to his God, “I 
knew that you are a gracious and compassionate God, slow to anger and abounding in 
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love, a God who relents from sending calamity” (Jon. 4:2, NIV). Christian scripture 
reveals the struggle of early Christian communities wrestling with the issue of 
prejudice. The well-known parable of the Good Samaritan reflects Jewish prejudice 
toward Samaritans. When asked, “Who is my neighbor” Jesus tells the story of an 
unnamed man robbed and left for dead. In the story, Jewish leaders (Priest and 
Levite) refuse to help the injured man while a Samaritan stops, helps, and provides 
the necessary care. When asked, “Which of these was a neighbor to the man who fell 
among robbers?” Jesus’ questioner simply responds, “the one who showed mercy”. 
The same religious, cultural, and ethnic prejudice dilemma drives significant portions 
of such Biblical books as Acts, Romans, Ephesians, and Galatians.  
The issue of prejudice continues to plague religion. What King observed 
pastorally, research has shown scientifically. Nine years before King’s comments, 
Allport (1954) wrote his monumental work The Nature of Prejudice, containing an 
insightful chapter on religion and prejudice, which begins with the observation, “The 
role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice” (p. 444). 
Citing Muslim and Christian missionary conflicts in Africa, Catholic, Jewish, and 
Protestant conflicts in Europe, and centuries of religious wars, Allport concludes: 
“While the creeds of the great religions are universalistic, all stressing brotherhood, 
the practice of these creeds is frequently divisive and brutal” (1954, p. 444).  
 It is on this paradox, that is, the connection between religiosity and prejudice, 
the present studies are focused.  
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Terror Management Theory 
Racism and prejudice are by nature clashes of cultural worldviews. Basic 
assumptions of value and identity conflict and often result in derogation, rejection, 
and abuse of the opposing worldview. So what is it about different others that brings 
out prejudice and/or racist reactions? 
Terror management theory (TMT: Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 
1986; Greenberg & Pyszczynski et al., 1990; Rosenblatt & Greenberg et al., 1989) is 
a theory of human motivation that provides a broad explanatory framework for the 
function of worldviews and the resulting oftentimes negative effects of interactions 
between competing worldviews. According to TMT, the natural human drive for 
survival, coupled with the uniquely human cognitive ability to envision vulnerability 
and mortality, creates great potential for acute existential anxiety and terror. Such a 
powerful form of apprehension motivates humans to develop cultural worldviews in 
order to organize and give meaning to life, thus providing a buffer against the 
importunity of existential anxiety. According to TMT, living up to the standards and 
understandings of one’s worldview allows a person to gain meaning, self-esteem, and 
a sense of transcendence. These in turn help buffer the potential terror caused by 
thoughts of death. The theory asserts failure to live up to the standards and meanings 
of one’s cultural worldview (CWV) or doubting the worldview itself increases the 
potential for terror, and all the negative consequences that so often accompany it.  
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Mortality Salience 
The psychological function of mortality underlies TMT (Greenberg et al., 
1990; Greenberg & Pyszczynski et al.1994; Rossenblatt, et al., 1989). The mortality 
salience (MS) hypothesis is built upon the assumption that:  
To the extent that a psychological structure provides protection against 
anxiety, then reminding people of the source of their anxiety should lead to an 
increased need for that structure and thus more positive reactions to things that 
support it and more negative reactions to things that threaten it. (Pyszczynski, 
Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999, p. 835) 
TMT argues that death is the underlying cause of existential anxiety and thus, 
reminding people of death leads to an increased need for the psychological 
structures—primarily in the form of one’s cultural worldview and sense of self-
esteem—that protect against that anxiety. Life is lived with the understanding that it 
will someday end; admittedly however, people do not spend every moment 
contemplating their own death. Still, TMT research has shown that the psychological 
structure works both consciously and unconsciously (Greenberg et al., 1994; 
Pyszczynski et al., 1999), though in different ways. Greenberg et al. (1994, Study 3) 
found that subjects responded to reminders of their mortality differently depending on 
whether their response came immediately after a mortality prime (conscious 
awareness) or whether they completed a distraction task following the prime 
(nonconscious, i.e., outside of focal awareness). Participants completing a death-
awareness measure immediately following the mortality prime, during what is termed 
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proximal terror management defense, showed lower levels of death-awareness than 
those completing the same measure after a brief distraction, at which point distal 
terror management defensive processes are posited to be in effect.  
Pyszczynski et al. (1999) further developed the distinction between conscious, 
proximal reactions, and unconscious, distal reactions to mortality salience through 
their duel-process model. The model explains how conscious awareness of death is 
defended against by using proximal defenses, wherein attempts are made to remove 
death-related thoughts from focal attention. Proximal defense involves suppressing 
death-related thoughts with distractions or rationalizing the potential of death into the 
distant future. When mortality is out of conscious attention, residual nonconscious 
responses to death stimulate distal defenses, wherein individuals rely more heavily on 
their CWV and sense of self-esteem to provide and bolster symbolic conceptions of 
themselves and how they relate to the world around them.  
Since people spend most of their time with something other than death within 
their immediate focal attention, it is the distal defensive processes that tend to govern 
much of everyday interactions. Distal defenses rely on CWV structure to provide 
meaning and explanation for what goes on in the world around us. Worldviews define 
reality and value in life, providing the structure and interpretive lens through which 
people make sense of their surroundings and the events taking place (Landau et al., 
2004). Worldviews “provide a means of conceptualizing reality that allows for the 
possibility of equanimity in the face of human vulnerability and mortality” 
(Greenberg et al., 1990, p. 308).   
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Buffering Terror 
Our cultural worldviews buffer the anxiety of death by providing a sense of 
both literal and symbolic immortality to those adhering to its assumed validity 
(Rossenblatt et al., 1989; Greenberg et al., 1990). Symbolic immortality provides 
transcendence for individuals’ cultural contributions by allowing their lives to be 
imbued with meaning and perceived significance beyond the grave, thus bestowing a 
sense of immortality. Through symbolic immortality individuals feel part of 
something greater than themselves via associations with families, nations, and ideals. 
When primed to think of death, individuals have shown an increased concern for key 
elements of their cultural values, such as status, prestige, relationships, nationalism, 
and the desire for offspring (Burling, 1993; Florian & Mikulincer, 1997; Fritsche, 
2007). These cultural values provide a sense of death transcendence, allowing 
individuals’ memory and contributions to continue long after their bodies die and 
their corporeal existence comes to an end.  
Cultural worldviews may also provide a form of literal immortality, via 
religious conceptions, wherein a person literally lives on in some conscious form of 
afterlife e.g., heaven, reincarnation, nirvana, resurrection, etc. (Dechesne et al., 2003; 
Vail et al., 2010), for if there is conscious existence beyond death, then existential 
anxiety may be buffered, and the terror of death ameliorated. In illustration of this, 
Dechesne et al. (2003) found that participants provided with medical research 
supporting out of body afterlife experiences were less likely to seek out symbolic 
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forms of immortality (self-esteem striving) than participants given psychological and 
physiological explanations for out of body afterlife experiences.  
Worldviews can only provide anxiety buffering results if individuals have and 
can maintain faith in their own particular CWV, and their standing within it 
(Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992; Pyszczynksi, Greenberg, 
Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). Self-esteem is “the feeling that one is an object of 
primary value in a meaningful universe” (Greenberg et al., 1992, p. 913). If either of 
these conditions goes unmet, or is sufficiently threatened, then one is left with little to 
defend against the terror of death. Self-esteem may come through individuals’ own 
evaluations of their standing within their CWV, or it may come through the feedback 
and validation provided by others sharing their CWV (Greenberg et al., 1992).  
TMT theorist have found that bolstering a person’s sense of self-esteem leads 
to a reduction of anxiety in the face of threat (Greenberg et al., 1992, Study 1), 
reduced physiological arousal when anticipating a painful shock (Greenberg et al., 
1992, Study 2, & 3), and denial of a short life expectancy (Greenberg et al., 1993, 
Studies 1 & 2). This reduction in existential anxiety has been demonstrated in both 
experimentally enhanced self-esteem, and dispositionally high self-esteem conditions 
(Greenberg et al., 1993). Similarly, bolstering a person’s CWV through social 
validation or evidentiary support reduces mortality salience effects (Greenberg et al., 
1990; Landau et al., 2004; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel & Martins, 2005). The 
reverse has also proven true: threatening either of these two components can increase 
mortality salience effects. Similarly, self-esteem threats increase death-anxiety 
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(Routledge, 2012) and death thought accessibility (DTA: Hayes, Schimel, Faucher, & 
Williams, 2008). Moreover, threatening various aspects of a person’s CWV increases 
DTA (Schimel et al., 2008). Arnt and Greenberg (1999) found that increased self-
esteem may only reduce mortality salience effects provided that particular beliefs on 
which that self-esteem is built (i.e., worldview standards of valued conduct) are not 
threatened.  
Cultural Worldview Defense 
Since CWVs are “essentially socially constructed fictions” (Rosenblatt et al., 
1989, p. 682) dependent on social consensus, their perceived validity faces continual 
threat by alternative worldviews and/or conflicting information. Threats can come in a 
variety of forms including violations of cultural values (Rosenblatt et al., 1989), 
competing worldviews (Greenberg et al., 1990), violations of basic worldview 
components (Landau et al., 2004; Schimel et al., 1999), or direct threats against the 
underlying foundations of a worldview (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003; 
Schimel et al., 2007). When either component of self-esteem is threatened – validity of 
CWV or standing within that CWV – individuals will engage in efforts to bolster their 
self-esteem and CWV and/or derogate the source of the threat and their conflicting 
CWV.  
Early TMT research showed that under MS, violators of the CWV’s standards 
were punished more severely than in a control group (Solomon et al., 1989). The 
reverse proved true as well; when people are viewed as upholding cultural values, 
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participants under MS show greater tolerance, and increase their desire to reward 
them (Study 3).  
Drawing on Festinger (1954), and Byrne (1971), TMT posits that interactions 
with similar others holding similar values and beliefs provide consensual validation 
of a person’s CWV (Greenberg et al., 1990). When another person shares our CVW, 
it suggests our worldview is not the result of individual bias, but rather objective, 
reasonable belief in the true state of affairs. This validation increases faith in a chosen 
CWV, thereby increasing its buffering effectiveness against the terror of death (i.e., 
the existential anxiety felt when mortality is made salient). Schimel et al. (1999) did 
find a slight exception; their research showed MS increased the perceptions of out-
group members who acted in stereotypically consistent ways compared to out-group 
members who may be more similar, yet acted in stereotypically inconsistent ways 
(also see Landau et al., 2004). Rather than disconfirming TMT’s worldview defense 
concepts, Schimel et al. demonstrated the significant role worldviews play in 
organizing conceptions of reality. Since stereotypes are based on one’s CWV, a 
person violating these assumptions may be seen as a threat to the absolute validity of 
that particular CWV.  
TMT and Prejudice 
TMT helps explain the motivational underpinnings behind prejudice in two 
critical ways. First, prejudice provides a way to organize information according to 
one’s worldview (Allport, 1954; Landau et al., 2004; Schimel et al., 1999). The 
meaning and structure provided by CWVs is critical in buffeting the terror of 
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mortality. Stereotypes and prejudice provide heuristic boundaries to identify ingroup 
and outgroup members. Schimel et al.’s (1999) work suggests the buffering effects of 
such organization play a vital role in one’s life, even to the point that contradictory 
information is perceived as a threat, regardless of whether such contradictions may be 
deemed positive (e.g., a young black man whistling Vivaldi; Steele, 2010). Whenever 
mortality is made salient, people cling to their stereotypes to provide a comforting 
pattern of meaning, secure in its reliability to reassure and validate their 
psychological equanimity (Landau et al., 2004).  
Secondly, TMT explains the derogation of outgroup members (prejudice) 
given their perceived threat to one’s worldview. TMT has demonstrated such 
treatment as recommendation of harsher penalties against worldview violators 
(Rosenblatt et al., 1989), negative impressions of outgroups (Greenberg et al., 1990; 
Greenberg et al., 1992) and decreased liking for people who violate stereotypical 
expectations (Landau et al., 2004; Schimel et al., 1999). 
 Whenever a different worldview is encountered, it suggests a potential 
alternative to how one sees the world and makes meaning within it (Landau et al., 
2004). If similar others tend to bolsters one’s worldview, then, according to TMT, 
dissimilar others tend to threaten one’s CWV (Greenberg et al., 1990). The very 
presence of a competing CWVs suggests alternative ways of viewing the world and 
raises potential doubts about the objectivity and reasonableness of a particular 
worldview, thereby decreasing effectiveness as a buffer against anxiety, and thus 
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generating distal terror management defense in the form of hostility towards the 
dissimilar others.  
TMT and Religion 
Within the framework of TMT, religious worldviews offer some of the 
strongest buffers against the terror of death. Religion’s strength comes from its ability 
to provide meaning and structure, self-esteem, and literal forms of immortality within 
various cultural contexts. Religion provides answers to basic questions of origin, 
significance, and purpose of life (see Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003; 
Vail et al., 2010). As mentioned, religion provides a dual view of immortality: literal 
and symbolic. In one’s lifetime, religion provides a sense of meaning, defines life as 
it should be lived, and offers the security of a transcendent protector and provider. In 
short, religion offers “the opportunity to live a meaningful life, to feel significant and 
eternal” (Jonas & Fischer, 2006, p. 553). The self-esteem believers gain through their 
connection with their chosen deity provides a means of survival in the present world 
through their dependence on its ability to provide protection, along with an avenue 
towards the worldly and spiritual necessities one needs to survive (Greenberg & 
Landau, In press; Vail et al., 2010).  
The ability of religion to provide such a strong buffer against death and terror 
has led some scholars to conclude that terror management is the primary 
psychological function of religion (Greenberg & Landau, In Press). This terror 
management function is seen by Vail et al. (2010) as the explanation as to why the 
earliest religious beliefs were developed and maintained in the first place. Uhlmann, 
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Poehlman, and Bargh (2008) even suggest humans have within them an implicit 
theism which serves, in part, to deal with existential anxiety.  
The strong connection between religion and death awareness is demonstrated 
throughout the world’s literature. Moreover, belief in a literal form of afterlife 
increases with mortality salience (Osarchuck & Tatz, 1973), as does belief in a 
supernatural agency (Norenazyan & Hansen, 2006), to the extent that when 
fundamental aspects of a person’s faith are challenged, mortality thoughts become 
more accessible.  
Religion and Racism 
Given the universal claim of religions to seek the brotherhood of humanity 
(Allport, 1954), and the ability of religions to provide avenues toward self-esteem and 
immortality, it would seem religion should also provide an effective belief system for 
reducing prejudice. Such optimism, however, has been met with disappointingly 
mixed empirical evidence.  
In his influential work The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) begins his 
chapter on religion and prejudice with this insightful observation: “The role of 
religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice” (p. 444). Twelve 
years later, he expressed a similar conclusion, writing, “Two contrary sets of threads 
are woven into the fabric of all religion—the warp of brotherhood and the woof of 
bigotry” (Allport, 1966).  
Allport’s observations were grounded in a “long parade of findings” (Allport 
& Ross, 1967, p. 432) demonstrating a positive correlation between measures of 
13 
 
religiosity and levels of prejudice (see Allport, 1967; Batson & Ventis, 1982 for 
reviews). Allport’s own research showed Protestant and Catholic students more likely 
to be racially prejudiced against Blacks than respondents who had no religious 
connection (Allport & Kramer, 1946). The same study revealed a correlation between 
strong religious influence in the home and racial prejudice. Concerned that Allport 
and Kramer’s research contained a sampling bias among participants, Rosenblith 
(1949) replicated the study only to find similar results. By 1966, Allport considered it 
a “well-established fact in social science” (p. 447) that American churchgoers were, 
on average, more intolerant than non-churchgoers.  
Subsequent research has continued to demonstrate the paradoxical relationship 
between religion and prejudice. Batson and Ventis’ (1982) meta-analysis of studies 
conducted between 1940 and 1975 confirmed the trend. These studies utilized several 
measures of prejudice (racial, ethnocentric, anti-Semitic, etc), and indexes of religious 
involvement (church attendance, views toward religion, orthodoxy or conservative 
religious belief). Results showed 34 of 44 findings exhibiting positive correlations 
between the amount of prejudice and the amount of religious involvement, interest, or 
adherence. They conclude:  “Among White, middle-class Christians in the United 
States, religion is not associated with increased love and acceptance, but with 
increased intolerance, prejudice, and bigotry” (p. 257). 
Explaining the Paradox 
Allport (1954; 1966) explained the paradox within three contexts or 
influences: theological, sociocultural, and personal-psychological. The theological 
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context contains “three invitations to bigotry” (Allport, 1966, p. 449) which exist 
across the religious spectrum. First, the doctrine of revelation leads religions to claim 
absolute truths and view other religious and philosophical positions as a threat. 
Second, the doctrine of election establishes distinctions between the saved and 
unsaved, the ins and outs. “Since God is for the ins, the outs must be excluded from 
privileges, and in extreme cases eliminated by sword or by fire” (Allport, 1966, p. 
450). The third “invitation to bigotry”, is the concept of theocracy. “No theological 
idea has caused so much persecution and suffering in both the old world and the new 
as have the various versions of theocracy” (Allport, 1960, p. 450). In a theocracy, the 
state is an instrument of the church, and therefore, violation of appointed monarchs 
and legal codes are the equivalent of violating divine rule. As a result, the state is 
considered divinely appointed to carry out divine judgment. Though descriptive of the 
past, Allport believed the theological context of prejudice was becoming less of a 
factor having experienced a significant relaxation. This shift is largely attributed to 
the first amendment of the US constitution guaranteeing religious liberty and a 
separation between church and state.  
While the theological context was declining, Allport believed the sociocultural 
influence of religion was ascending (1954; 1967). Religion serves “double duty” 
(Allport, 1954, p. 446) when it is used to support cultural structures such as class 
divisions, ethnocentrism, and segregation. Since religious communities are comprised 
of like-minded people and religion serves as a conservative cultural force, it functions 
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in the same way as prejudice by providing cognitive structures through which culture 
is understood:  
Some, for example, are tormented by self-doubt and insecurity. Prejudice 
enhances their self-esteem; religion provides them a tailored security. Others 
are guilt-ridden; prejudice provides a scapegoat, and religion relief. Still 
others live in fear of failure. Prejudice provides an explanation in terms of 
menacing out-groups; religion promises heavenly, if not terrestrial, rewards. 
Thus for many individuals the functional significance of prejudice and 
religion is identical. One does not cause the other; rather both satisfy the same 
psychological needs (Allport, 1966, p. 451). 
Even more significant than the theological and sociocultural influences of 
religion is the personal psychological function of religion in one’s life (Allport, 
1966). Whatever theological and sociocultural influence religion may hold, it holds 
only to the extent that religion functions in a person’s life. It is here that Allport made 
one of the most significant contributions to the study of psychology and religion 
(Batson & Ventis, 1982; Donahue, 1985). Allport noted that religion does not 
function equally for everyone:  
Its functional significance may range from its crutch-like ability to bolster 
infantile and magical forms of thinking to its support for a guiding and 
comprehensive view of life that turns the individual from his self-centeredness 
towards genuine love for his neighbor.  (Allport, 1954, pp. 451-452) 
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Allport’s (1950) earlier research focused on two basic forms of religion: 
mature and immature. Immature religion was described as “impulsive self-
gratification,” “wish-fulfilling,” “self-centered,” as well as “spasmodic, segmented, 
and even when fanatic in intensity, it is but partially integrative of the personality” (p. 
54). Mature religion was much more stable. It is, “well differentiated”, 
“comprehensive”, and “productive of consistent morality” (p. 57). Mature religion is 
more critical of religious concepts, open to new information, and honest with difficult 
questions of morality.  
Allport never provided a way of empirically assessing his concept of mature 
and immature religion. In his 1954 work Allport labeled the distinction as 
“institutional” religion and “interiorized” religion (Allport, 1954, p. 453). This 
terminology suggested a marked difference between belonging to a church for its in-
group benefits (institutional) and belonging to a church because of its basic creed of 
brotherhood and personalizing this creed (interiorized). By 1959 Allport came to use 
the terms “intrinsic” and extrinsic” to describe the way religion functions in a 
person’s life.  
 As noted by Batson and Ventis (1982), this new conceptualization was far 
less value-laden than the terms “mature” and “immature” and the definitions of the 
terms was more narrow in focus. Extrinsic religiosity is utilitarian and instrumental in 
nature, using religion as a means to gain something else: safety, social standing, 
peace, and to support their chosen way of life (Allport, 1954; 1966; Allport & Ross, 
1967). For extrinsics, religion is, “something for an occasional Sunday morning, for 
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High Holy days, or for moments of crisis” (Allport, 1966, p. 455). Intrinsic religion is 
of ultimate value to the individual and an end in itself. Intrinsics hold religion as a 
master motive for life and are other-focused. Allport and Ross (1967) summarized the 
distinction succinctly, writing, “The extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, 
whereas the intrinsically motivated lives his religion” (p. 434).  
Allport believed this distinction helped address the question of prejudice: 
“Thus we cannot speak sensibly of the relation between religion and prejudice 
without specifying the sort of religion we mean and the role it plays in the personal 
life (Allport, 1954, p. 456). Since an intrinsically religious person internalizes the 
teachings of his or her religious beliefs, then the brotherhood of humanity, as 
universally taught by religion (Allport, 1954) would be internalized and prejudice 
would be reduced. Extrinsically religious individuals who use religion as a means to 
secure safety, peace, status, and sociability and who “turn to God, but without turning 
away from self” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 434) would not take the creed of universal 
brotherhood as seriously, and would instead show higher levels of prejudice.  
Allport and Ross first provided empirical support for the religious orientation 
scale in 1967. Results verified previous findings which showed a positive correlation 
between religious involvement and prejudice tendencies. However, Allport and Ross 
also found the relationship to be curvilinear such that frequent attenders were less 
prejudiced than infrequent attenders, and often less prejudiced than non-attenders. As 
expected, extrinsics showed higher levels of prejudice and intrinsics showed lower 
levels of prejudice. They also found a third type of orientation labeled 
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“indiscriminantly proreligious”. These individuals believe all forms of religion are 
good and endorse any and all items on the scale that were favorable to religion. For 
example, they might respond positively to seemingly contradictory statements, i.e., 
“My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life” and, 
“Though I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my 
life” (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 437). Indiscriminantly proreligious respondents were 
more prejudiced than consistent extrinsics and much more prejudiced than consistent 
intrinsics. Allport and Ross explained the indiscriminantly proreligious as making the 
same mistake positively with religion that they make negatively with stereotypes, 
“religion as a whole is good; a minority group as a whole is bad” (p. 442).  
The intrinsic/extrinsic dichotomy proposed by Allport shares characteristics 
with Kierkegaard’s paradox of faith (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974). In Fear and 
Trembling Kierkegaard uses the story of Abraham offering his son, Isaac, to discuss 
the nature of authentic faith. The story represents a paradox of faith. If Abraham 
followed a universal ethic (worldly wisdom), then offering his son would constitute 
murder. If Abraham, however, believed by virtue of the absurd through which, “there 
could be no question of human calculation” (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 46) then 
such an act would be labeled a sacrifice and a true expression of faith. In such case, 
Abraham would be a “Knight of Faith” As such, “the individual isolates himself as 
higher than the universal” (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 65). Genuine faith allowed 
obedience even to the absurd against the claims of the universal ethic. Such faith led 
to a more joyous and fulfilling life.  
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Kierkegaard believed that individuals lacking genuine faith are left to express 
themselves according to the universal, which causes them, “to abolish his [sic] 
particularity in order to become the universal” (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, pp. 64-65, 
see also Martin, Campbell & Henry, 2004). Instead of being true to one’s self, such 
an individual is diminished into the universal, which Kierkegaard believed to be 
shallow and insignificant. In Purity of the Heart is to Will One Thing Kierkegaard 
wrote, “the most ruinous evasion of all is to be hidden in the crowd in an attempt to 
escape God’s supervision of him as an individual, in an attempt to get away from 
hearing God’s voice as an individual”  (1846/1948, p. 185).  
With his focus on the individual, Kierkegaard believed media and the 
institutionalized church of his day contributed to shallowness and stood in the way of 
individuals finding genuine faith, or their own individual selves (Holt, 2012). 
Swenson and Swenson (1955) note that Kierkegaard viewed the established church 
“several degrees lower than that set forth in the New Testament” (p. xix). In the 
absence of a true inner self, the only guide to follow is that which is received from 
culture (Holt, 2012; Martin et al., 2004). Instead, genuine faith was found in the 
self/individual. Thus, Kierkegaard wrote, “Eternity seizes each one by the strong arm 
of conscience, holding him as an individual” (1843/1948, p. 192).  
Allport’s description of intrinsic/extrinsic religion echoes Kierkegaard’s 
contrast between the universal and the self. Allport described intrinsics as having 
“interiorized” religion and extrinsics as having “institutionalized” religion (Allport, 
1954, p. 453). Using the story of Simon Peter and his initial reluctance as a Jewish 
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man to enter the house of Cornelius, a Roman centurion (Acts 10), Allport noted, “He 
[Peter] knew that according to his own tribal custom, ‘it is an unlawful thing for a 
man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one of another nation.’” (Allport, 
1954, p. 453). Peter’s tribal custom was in conflict with what he understood to be 
“Christ’s compassion for outcasts” (Allport, 1954, p. 453). Only after Peter 
experienced a “change of heart” (Allport, 1954, p. 454) did he turn away from his 
tribal custom to follow true interiorized religion. 
Allport’s intrinsic/extrinsic distinction garnered considerable support early on 
(see Batson & Ventis, 1982; Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010 for a review of studies) with 
results showing intrinsic religiosity negatively correlated with prejudice and extrinsic 
religiosity positively correlating with prejudice. Hall, Matz, and Wood (2010) 
conducted a similar analysis using 55 studies reported between 1964 and 2008, 
controlling for potential publication bias, participant bias, and year of publication. 
Results likewise demonstrate, “greater religious identification, greater extrinsic 
religiosity, and greater religious fundamentalism were all positively related to racism” 
(p. 130).  
Questioning Allport’s Approach 
Since its original design, the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has faced 
challenges and further scrutiny with use of both overt and covert measures. First, 
Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) questioned the use of overt measures of prejudice, 
suggesting the negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity and prejudice might 
be the result of social desirability instead of true reductions in prejudice. Batson et 
21 
 
al.’s (1978) initial findings replicated those of Allport and Ross (1967) showing a 
negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity on questionnaire measures of 
prejudice, and were significantly more negative than the correlation between extrinsic 
orientation and prejudice. Only intrinsic religiosity displayed a positive correlation 
with social desirability, though when controlled for, the decrease was statistically 
insignificant in questionnaire responses to prejudice. However, when social 
desirability was psychometrically controlled through partial correlations, the negative 
correlation between intrinsic religion and prejudice decreased.  
The issue of social desirability has been noted by other scholars. When covert 
measures have been used to measure prejudice, or social desirability is taken into 
account, the negative correlation disappears (Batson et al., 1986; Burris & Navara, 
2002; Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997). Batson 
et al. (1978) suggest intrinsics may be more concerned to “present oneself more 
righteous than one actually is” (p. 38) and that “the personal transformation that 
Allport (1966) claimed is associated with intrinsic religion may have reached only to 
the hand that marks the questionnaire, not to the heart” (Batson & Burris, 1994, p. 
152).  
A second criticism questions the bi-polar nature of Allport and Ross’ (1967) 
Intrinsic/Extrinsic scale. In the original publication (Allport & Ross, 1967), Allport 
and Ross found intrinsic and extrinsic scores represented two independent dimensions 
but they also found some respondents were “consistently intrinsics”, some were 
“consistently extrinsic” but that many subjects were “provokingly inconsistent” (p. 
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437) or “muddleheaded” (p. 439). Allport and Ross divided these inconsistencies into 
two categories: indiscriminantly pro-religious and indiscriminantly nonreligious (or 
anti-religious). High intrinsic, high extrinsic scores were labeled indiscriminantly 
proreligious. Those who scored low on both the intrinsic and extrinsic subscales were 
labeled indiscriminantly antireligious. When prejudice was measured, indiscriminant 
types were more prejudiced than either of the consistent types.  
Batson (1976) has proposed a three-dimensional scale that conceptually 
corresponds to the intrinsic and extrinsic orientation which he labels religion as 
means and religion as end respectively. His new model includes a third dimension 
independent of either an extrinsic or intrinsic dimension, labeled as quest. Batson and 
Ventis (1982) contend that quest religiosity captures Allport’s original conception of 
mature religion. The quest orientation:  
Concerns the degree to which the individual seeks to face religious issues such 
as personal mortality or meaning in life in all their complexity, yet resists 
clear-cut, pat answers. An individual who approaches religion in this way 
recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably never will know, the 
final truth about such matters. Still the questions are deemed important and, 
however tentative and subject to change, answers are sought. (Batson & 
Burris, 1994, p. 157)  
In multiple studies, the quest orientation has proven to be a more stable form 
of religion. Quest correlated negatively with prejudice in both questionnaire and 
behavioral (i.e., choice of black or white interviewer) measures of prejudice (Batson, 
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Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, & Pych, 1986; Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978). Even when 
social desirability was controlled for psychometrically on explicit measures, the 
negative relationship between quest and prejudice did not diminish (Batson, Naifeh, 
& Pate, 1978). Quest exhibits universal compassion, even toward those who violate 
its non-close-mindedness characteristic (Batson, Denton & Vollmecke, 2008).  
Batson’s concept of quest also captures elements of Kierkegaard’s knight of 
faith (1843/1974). Abraham’s decision to offer Isaac contradicted the universal ethic 
and could not be made based upon any universally accepted logic. Given this paradox 
between the universal and the individual, explanation and understanding remain 
inadequate. It is the universal that seeks answers and justification within the universal 
framework, and anything outside such explanation viewed as “crazy” (Kierkegaard, 
1843/1974, p. 84). As such, “the individual absolutely cannot make himself 
intelligible to anybody” (Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 81). Within this paradox, 
questions remain, and just as Batson’s quest orientation suggests, such an individual 
“recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably never will know” (Batson & 
Burris, 1994, p. 157). 
One significant difference between Batson’s quest and Kierkegaard’s knight 
of faith concerns the issue of certainty. Batson’s quest orientation operates from a 
position of uncertainty and values the journey of an “open-ended, questioning 
approach to religion” (Batson et al., 1993). As such, the journey becomes a primary 
feature of the quest orientation. Batson even notes, “there may or may not be a belief 
in a transcendent reality” (Batson & Ventis, 1982, p. 150), leading Donahue (1985) to 
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suggest that quest may be measuring agnosticism and religious conflict. Kierkegaard, 
however, viewed the knight of faith as acting from an “absolute duty to God” 
(1843/1974, p. 91) and having “assurance that he [sic] is in the right way” 
(1843/1974, p. 90). The inability to “make himself intelligible to anybody” 
(Kierkegaard, 1843/1974, p. 81) comes, not from a lack of certainty in his duty, but 
from an inability to offer a universally acceptable justification. Like Abraham, the 
duty was unquestioned, but the understanding and explanation was lacking.  
TMT and Religious Orientation 
Most relevant to the current research is the relation between religious 
orientation and worldview defense. Some studies have measured religion in general 
terms without the distinction between types of religious orientations. In such studies, 
religious beliefs were negatively correlated with derogation of culturally threatening 
messages (Norenzayan, DarNimrod, Hansen, & Proulx, 2009) and a reduction in 
prejudice (Kastenmuller, Greitemeyer, Ai, Winter, & Fischer,  2011). Rothschild, 
Abdollahi, and Pyszczynski (2009) showed that priming mortality and religious 
compassion among fundamentalist – those who believe there is a single set of 
absolute truths -  reduced preference toward military action against a threatening 
nation. Several studies have focused on fundamentalism as a characteristic of 
religious orientation (see Vail et al., 2009 for review), with fewer studies 
investigating concepts of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest orientations. Jonas and Fischer 
(2006) found that intrinsic religiosity reduced death-thought awareness, and mitigated 
worldview defense in cases where participants had the opportunity to affirm religious 
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beliefs through completion of the religious orientation scale either before the MS 
treatment or at the end of the experiment. They conclude that TMT benefits of 
religion are only available to people who show an intrinsic orientation. Their research 
made no mention of quest orientation. Zavala, Cichoka, Orehek, and Abdollahi 
(2012) found that under motility salience, intrinsic religiosity showed decreased 
support for aggressive counterterrorism (Study 1), decreased out-group derogation 
(Study 2), and that priming intrinsic concepts likewise decreased support for 
aggressive counterterrorism (Study 3). 
Non-Religious Discrepancies 
Allport’s paradox has parallels outside the boundaries of religion. A lot has 
changed in the 20
th
 century in regard to Civil Rights: school desegregation, voting 
rights, the election of the first Black President of the United States. Among many 
subcultures, at least, cultural norms have shifted more dramatically in favor of equal 
treatment, integration, and tolerance (Bobo, Charles, Krysan, & Simmons, 2009). 
This change has been noted by White’s self-reported attitudes towards Blacks (Bobo, 
Charles, Krysan & Simmons 2012; Greeley & Shirley, 1971; Schuman, Steeh, & 
Bobo, 1985). But just how genuine is this change? When self-reported attitudes are 
compared with subconscious measures of prejudice (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; 
Devine, 1989; Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010) or conscious behavior (Hall, Matz, 
& Wood, 2010; Monteith & Voil, 1998), inconsistencies remain present between 
stated non-racist beliefs and actual actions.  
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These discrepancies are often attributed to some form of impression 
management strategy. In an overview of studies investigating different prejudice 
measures (surveys, helping behavior, aggression studies and nonverbal behavior), 
Crosby, Bromley and Saxe (1980) suggested the discrepancies may reflect changing 
social desirability effects and not real change in attitudes. Their conclusion called into 
question the validity of verbal reports leading them to conclude, “Whites today are, in 
fact, more prejudiced than they are wont to admit” (p. 557). Studies have shown that 
under certain conditions - personal implications (Silverman, 1974), hearing other’s 
nonprejudiced view first (Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996), hearing negative 
views first (Winttenbrink & Henley, 1996) – people tend to alter their responses to 
reflect a concern for social acceptance. 
Disassociation Model 
Devine (1989), however, suggests a more optimistic understanding of the 
conflict between stated beliefs and actions. Devine suggests the contradiction may 
represent the possibility for true change in a person’s attitudes and beliefs. According 
to Devine’s (1989) Dissociation Model:  
Although low-prejudiced persons have changed their beliefs concerning 
stereotyped group members, the stereotype has not been eliminated from the 
memory system. In fact, it remains a well-organized, frequently activated 
knowledge structure. During the change process the new pattern of ideas and 
behaviors must be consciously activated and serve as the bases for responses 
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or the individual is likely to fall into old habits (e.g., stereotype-congruent or 
prejudice-like responses. (Devine, 1989, p. 16)  
Since stereotypes are long held beliefs, attempts to change them take time and 
effort. Nonprejudiced responses are intentional, controlled processes that require 
conscious effort. Like breaking a bad habit, individuals must decide to change their 
behavior, hold to the resolution, and consciously work to defeat the habit until it is 
eliminated (Devine, 1989). If a person wants to hold an egalitarian view of minorities 
and/or out-group members, they must consciously work to maintain that view. If 
unconscious responses are activated in the midst of trying to defeat prejudice, then 
conscious and unconscious responses might contradict.  
To measure the unconscious aspects of prejudice, researchers have used some 
form of the Implicit Association Test (IAT: Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998, see also Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 2012). The IAT 
measures response times of participants as they react to different combinations of 
stimuli (i.e. images of Black or White individuals, and positive or negative words). 
Participants are asked to identify words as positive or negative valiance as they are 
placed below images of either a Black or White individual. They are also asked to 
identify individuals as either Black or White when the image is placed below a 
positive or negative valiance term. The test works from the assumption that to the 
extent that negative views are associated with Whites or Blacks, the pairing of 
contradictory concepts (positive term with black image, or negative term with White 
image) will cause a delay in response time as participants try to process the proper 
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response. Since such responses are subconscious and therefore participants are less 
likely to control them, the IAT provides insight into the subconscious nature of 
prejudice.  
Holmes’ (2009) research into the transparency of self-report (conscious) 
measures showed participants equally concerned about social implications behind 
different scale items and their ability to manipulate responses accordingly. However, 
like Monteith and Voil (1998), when social desirability was statistically controlled 
for, there was no significant mean difference among prejudice measures. Holmes 
(2009) concludes, “Changes in scores on prejudice measures may reflect both real 
changes in attitudes and increased social awareness (i.e., awareness of the ‘right’ or 
‘correct’ socially desirable answers)” (p. 99).  
The dissociation model of prejudice reduction suggests that prejudice 
reduction can be achieved through a change process involving three steps: (a) 
establishing nonprejudiced standards based on personal beliefs for how one should 
respond (b) internalizing these standards through a link to self-concept, viewing them 
as important—and committing to them, and (c) learning to inhibit automatic 
stereotypic responses in order to respond consistently with one’s personal standards 
(see Devine & Monteith, 1993).  
Placed within the framework of dissociation, Allport’s conception of religion 
theoretically provides an explanation of the first two elements. First, as noted by 
Allport (1954), it is a universal claim of religion to advance the brotherhood of 
humanity. Therefore, religion establishes nonprejudiced standards that should govern 
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responses of religious people. Allport’s intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, along with 
Batson’s notion of quest, provides a construction of the second element of the 
dissociation model by measuring the level of internalization of such standards within 
a person’s self-concept.  
Compunction 
One way to get at the underlying nature of any contradiction in stated beliefs 
and actions is through monitoring compunction. Compunction is the feeling of guilt 
or regret experienced when a personal value or standard has been personally violated. 
The concept of compunction was noted by Myrdal (1944), who spoke of an inner 
moral uneasiness existing in America resulting from a clash between the “American 
Creed” which called for a high national and Christian concept, and the reality of 
prejudices against persons or types of people. With echoes of Myrdal’s “American 
Dilemma”, Allport (1954) similarly spoke of the “inner conflict” that results when 
people “are genuinely in conflict concerning their failure to conform to the virtues 
they admire” (p. 328). This tension caused the average American, in Allport’s view, 
to live in a state of conflict. Allport believed such inner conflict was more likely than 
not to arouse some sense of compunction.  
This conflict is reflected in a review of the General Social Survey, (GSS: 
Bobo, Charles, Krysan & Simmons, 2009), which measures national demographics, 
attitudes, and special interest topics. An analysis of racial trends in the United States 
between 1972 and 2008 revealed both positive and negative views of prejudice. Bobo 
et al. (2009) found that while norms had shifted dramatically against negative 
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attitudes towards Blacks, strong social distance preference remained as well as 
negative racial stereotypes. Bobo et al. also found significant affective distance 
between Whites and African Americans as well as a “broad and widely shared 
cultural motif” (p. 41) of racial resentments. For instance, even in 2008, though 
Whites showed broad acceptance of integration, 1 in 4 Whites were opposed to a 
close family member marrying a black person (Bobo et al., 2009).  
When an individual is made aware of any discrepancy between actual beliefs 
and real response, a feeling of dissonance results (Festinger, 1962). When introducing 
his theory of dissonance, Festinger used the issue of race to illustrate his point, 
writing, “A person may think Negroes are just as good as Whites, but would not want 
any living in his neighborhood” (p. 1). Compunction provides an indication of 
whether internalized beliefs may have been violated.  
Drawing on dissonance theory, Devine and Monteith (1993) point to 
qualitatively different affective responses depending on the type of self-inconsistency. 
For example, whenever behavior and attitude conflict there will be tension and 
discomfort. However, when self-inconsistencies involve a person’s actual self and 
their self-defined standards, feelings of guilt and self-contempt result. Devine and 
Monteith have demonstrated this in their own research showing that violations of 
well-internalized standards of non-prejudice lead to greater levels of guilt and self-
contempt, violations of less-internalized standards lead only to a broader sense of 
tension and discomfort (Amodio et al., 2007; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993; 
Monteith et al., 1993).  
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Allport’s concept of compunction is similar to what Higgin’s self-discrepancy 
theory (SDT) predicts will happen when an individual violates personal standards he 
or she feels ought to be upheld (Higgins, 1987; Higgins, Bond, Klein, and Stramman, 
1985). Self-discrepancy theory maintains that incompatible beliefs lead to various 
levels of discomfort. The theory goes further to advance a predictive framework 
linking specific inconsistencies to specific forms of affect.  
Self-discrepancy theory lays out three domains of the self: actual self, ideal 
self, and ought self. Each domain describes the representations of one’s self based 
upon attributes an individual actually possess (actual), would like to possess (ideal), 
or ought to possess (ought). Along with the differing domains of self, the theory 
suggests two standpoints from which the self is viewed: your own personal 
standpoints and the standpoint of some significant other. When discrepancies exist 
between any of these representations, negative affect should result. 
 More specific to the current notion of racial compunction, when a 
discrepancy exists between an individual’s actual/own self (i.e. how they actually see 
themselves), and their ought/own self (i.e. how they believe they ought to be), self-
discrepancy  predicts the individual will be vulnerable to agitation-related emotions 
(i.e., guilt, self-contempt, and uneasiness) (Higgins, 1987). Therefore, according to 
SDT, an intrinsic would be a person who has internalized the religious sense of 
“ought”, and any violation of religious values would represent a discrepancy between 
their actual/own and ought/own self. Likewise, a person who only wishes to appear 
intrinsic or who only holds non-prejudiced values as received from culture without 
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having genuinely internalized the religious sense of ought (extrinsic), would be more 
concerned about a discrepancy between their actual/own self and ought/other self. 
Such a discrepancy is predicted to result in such agitation-related emotions as fear, 
and feeling threatened (Higgins, 1987).  
Dissonance and the resulting negative affect have proved to be a critical 
component in the process of reversing prejudice. Just as Festinger believed 
dissonance reduction to be a first motivational step in the process of resolving 
tension, Allport (1954) believed compunction could be a catalyst to true change: “if 
the dissatisfaction is great enough, he may be driven to a reorganization of beliefs and 
attitudes” (p. 329). Devine (1989) likewise considered compunction part of the “key 
to escaping prejudice” (p. 15) which serves an important role in the control and 
regulation of future responses (Devine & Monteith, 1993). Unless individuals feel a 
sense of tension between their own beliefs and actions, they will do little to affect 
either. When such tension exists, proactive measures are taken to relive tension and 
restore equilibrium and psychological equanimity.  
Knowledge of Prejudice  
Devine’s early work (1989) showed that people claiming to hold egalitarian 
views toward Blacks were equally capable of displaying prejudicial tendencies. Low-
prejudiced individuals are equally knowledgeable of cultural stereotypes against 
Blacks (Study 1), and when stereotypical concepts are primed, high- and low-
prejudice respondents interpret ambiguous stereo-type related behaviors in prejudicial 
ways (Study 2). Similarly, when low-prejudiced participants were asked to 
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uncritically list positive and/or negative alternative labels for Black Americans (thus 
threatening their non-prejudiced identity), they listed more positive than negative 
stereotypes. When asked to list their own beliefs, they again listed more positive than 
negative thoughts.  
When low-prejudiced participants were made aware of their ability to 
demonstrate negative-prejudice, negative affect became an issue among some. 
Besides Devine, other research has shown increased levels of negative affect when 
participants are made aware of discrepancies between personal standards and actual 
responses (Devine, 1989; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 
Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996). Zuwerink 
et al. (1996) showed that low-prejudiced respondents with well-internalized standards 
of non-prejudice experienced more compunction when their sense of “should” (i.e., 
how the respondent believed they ought to respond) and “would” (how the respondent 
believed they might actually respond) conflicted. The greater a respondent’s 
discrepancy between reported beliefs and actions, the greater their feeling of 
compunction. When non-prejudiced standards are internalized they become self-
defining. Violation of well-internalized standards are interpreted as a personal moral 
failure (Zuwerink et al., 1996).  
Should and Would Responses 
In an effort to develop a more reliable measure of Should-Would discrepancy, 
Monteith and Voil (1998) took into account a number of personality measures (self-
consciousness, social desirability, social-anxiety). Results showed respondents were 
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aware of self-reported discrepancies between should and would scores and that such 
discrepancies correlated positively with feelings of discomfort. When Self-
consciousness, social desirability, and social-anxiety were controlled for, the 
discrepancy-affect correlation was not significantly reduced (Study 1). Discrepancy 
scores remained stable over a relatively short period of time indicating their potential 
for demonstrating actual abilities to control prejudice-response beyond possible 
environmental factors (Study 2). Monteith and Voil (1998) also found similar 
discrepancies in behavioral response when low-prejudiced individuals with high-
discrepancy scores were monitored in their reaction to racial jokes (Study 3). This 
pattern, however, only took place when low-prejudice respondents with high 
discrepancy scores were highly-distracted. This corresponds to Devine’s (1989) claim 
that prejudice reduction requires a high state of conscious focus. When low-
prejudiced respondents were either not distracted or reported lower discrepancy 
scores, they responded in less prejudiced ways to racial jokes. Monteith and Voil 
(1998) conclude, “self-reported discrepancies apparently are authentic and do reflect 
people’s proneness to engaging in prejudiced responses that violate their personal 
standards” (p. 911). Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) found that guilt 
arising from personal transgressions (prejudice) serves as a predictor of interest in 
prejudice-reducing behavior. When participants experienced personal guilt for 
showing prejudice in response to pictures, their interest in reading prejudice-reduction 
articles increased significantly.  
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Internal/External Motivations 
Concern for impression-management and levels of social desirability involve 
external motivations when responding to prejudice. Attention must also be given to 
internal motivations. Studies have shown a significant difference in how people 
respond to prejudice based on whether their beliefs are internal to their sense of self, 
or external (Devine et al., 2002; Plant and Devine, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996).  
Plant and Devine’s (1998) Internal and External motivation to respond 
without prejudice scales (IMS and EMS) identify distinct motivations to control 
prejudice that have demonstrated predictive validity. The difference between internal 
and external motivation to respond without prejudice lies in who sets the standard. 
When the motivation to respond without prejudice derives from internal 
standards, the self is the evaluative audience of importance (i.e., the self 
prescribes the standard). When the motivation to respond without prejudice 
derives from external standards, significant others constitute the important 
evaluative audience (i.e., other prescribes the standard). (Plant and Devine, 
1998, p. 818) 
Violations of personal standards create greater dissonance and negative affect 
(Devine et al., 2002; Plant and Devine, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996). Drawing from 
reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) Plant and Devine (2001) showed that participants 
with low IMS, high EMS scores demonstrate greater levels of reactance. When non-
prejudiced values were internalized, pressure to conform to already held beliefs 
created little conflict and so reactance levels were low. Whenever non-prejudiced 
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values were externalized, participants were more resentful than others when pressured 
to respond in politically correct ways (Study 1) and demonstrated heightened levels of 
anger/threat affect when others imposed pressure to be pro-Black, and showed a form 
of backlash (in attitude and behavior).  
Devine et al. (2002) found further support for the IMS/EMS distinction in the 
work of Deci and Ryan (1985; 2000). Self-regulatory focus distinguishes between 
three kinds of motivation: external, interjected, and identified. External motivations 
are those that concern approval from others and reflect a low degree of self-
determination. Interjected motivations are governed by a high concern for the 
approval of others and self-determination to act in a given way. Identified motivations 
are highly internalized and are a significant part of a person’s self-concept. Research 
shows that the more internalized (i.e., self-determined and authentic) a goal or value 
is, the more consistency with which people respond to that goal or value (Deci & 
Ryan, 2000). When applied to the issue of race, Devine et al. (2002) found high 
correlation between Deci and Ryan’s motivational distinctions and their own 
IMS/EMS distinction. Devine et al. found that participants with low IMS scores were 
more likely to demonstrate higher levels of explicit racism than participants with high 
IMS scores. More importantly, Devine et al. (2002) found that participants with high 
IMS and low EMS scores were more consistent when responding to implicit bias. 
Therefore, the more internalized a person’s motivation to be non-prejudiced, the more 
consistent their response to prejudice, regardless of conscious or subconscious cues.  
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Undoing Prejudice 
Devine and Plant (2009) showed that people internally motivated to respond 
without prejudice actively worked to control prejudice and showed an interest in 
learning to reduce it. Devine, Forscher, Austin, and Cox’s (2012) longitudinal study 
demonstrated the possibility of long-term implicit race bias using the general concept 
of the dissociation model. Participants in an experimental group were given feedback 
and prejudice reduction strategies and reassessed throughout the course of 12 weeks. 
The strategies (intervention) included stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic 
imaging, individuation, perspective taking, and increasing opportunities for contact. 
When compared to a control group, Devine et al. (2012) found that implicit bias was 
reduced by week four and remained reduced through the end of the study. They also 
found participants in the experimental group increased self-reported concerns about 
discrimination and prejudice-relevant discrepancies. Interestingly, they did not find 
any measurable increase in the implicit bias ratings.  
Overall, the disassociation model suggests that not all discrepancies between 
implicit and explicit measures of racism represent a failure to live up to personal 
standards. Rather, such discrepancies may represent the activation of the prejudice 
habit that has formed over time. Whenever the conscious ability to inhibit prejudice 
responses is activated, signs of racism are present. However, if a person is in the 
process of undoing the habit, the conscious ability to suppress such prejudiced 
reactions leads to a discrepancy between implicit and explicit responses. Whenever 
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violations are perceived or made explicit, those committed to undoing the habit 
realize their failure to live up to their non-prejudiced goal, and compunction results.  
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses 
The purpose of the current research is to investigate cognitive processes which 
may contribute to the reduction of prejudice. Each of the previous sections of Chapter 
1 has described a critical element in the process of prejudice reduction. Chapter 2 will 
tie together TMT, Dissociation Model, and Religious orientations, and establish 
working hypothesis to be tested.  
Terror management theory provides a motivational framework for 
understanding the nature of prejudice. Since CWVs are used to defend against the 
terror of death (Greenberg et al., 1990;  Rosenblatt et al., 1989) and self-esteem is 
drawn from a person’s ability to live up to the standards of his or her worldview 
(Greenberg et al., 1992; Pyszczynski et al., 2004), any violation or challenge to a 
person’s self-esteem or worldview leads to undermining the buffering effects of these 
two mechanisms (Greenberg et al., 1990; Landau et al., 2004; Pyszczynski et al., 
2003; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel et al., 1990; Schimel et al., 2007). As 
demonstrated by previous research, competing CWVs present the possibility of a 
legitimate worldview alternative, thus potentially creating reason to question or doubt 
one’s chosen worldview (Greenberg et al., 1990; Landau et al., 2004), thereby 
weakening its effectiveness as an anxiety buffer. Prejudice can be thought of as a 
heuristic way of organizing perceived realities within a person’s CWV; and when 
defense against existential anxiety is presented, prejudice may be used to reorient and 
restore one’s sense of self-esteem, or reestablish confidence in one’s worldview 
(Allport, 1954; Greenberg et al., 1990; Landau et al., 2004; Schimel, 1999).  
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Devine’s (1989) dissociation model provides a general explanation for the 
potential reduction of prejudice. Since prejudice is a form of cultural programming, it 
takes time to deprogram. Devine’s work suggests that prejudice can be addressed and 
potentially reduced provided individuals make the determination to reduce it, and 
actively work to avoid prejudiced responses (Devine et al., 2012). To do so, there 
must be some guiding standard to influence their desire to be non-prejudiced (Devine 
et al., 2002).  
Allport’s (1954, 1959, 1966; Allport and Ross, 1967) early work in religious 
orientation suggested intrinsicality may serve as one standard by which prejudice may 
be reduced. Since the brotherhood of humanity is a universal claim of religion 
(Allport 1954, 1966) and intrinsic religiosity internalizes the teachings of one’s 
religion (Allport and Ross, 1967), then prejudice reduction should follow. Batson’s 
(1976; Batson et al., 1986) work suggests that the quest orientation works better to 
reduce prejudice given the social desirability concerns of intrinsic religiosity. If 
Allport and Batson are correct, then religion, to some degree, should serve as a guide 
for dissociation, which should be instrumental in the reduction of prejudice.  
As noted previously, religion’s role in the reduction of prejudice has been 
called into question. Some scholars have doubted the authenticity of responses to 
overt measures of prejudice, suggesting that social desirability masks or eliminates 
any potential reduction in measured prejudice among the intrinsically religious 
(Batson et al., 1986; Burris & Navara, 2002; Hall et al., 2010; Sedikides & Gebauer, 
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2010; Trimble, 1997). Still others have argued intrinsic religiosity actually increases 
levels of prejudice (Batson & Burris, 1994).  
The present work seeks to expand the current literature in the following ways. 
First, no known work to date has investigated Devine’s (1989) model within the 
broader framework of TMT. Terror management theory provides an explanatory 
framework for understanding various components of dissociation. Second, no known 
research to date has evaluated religious orientations in light of Devine’s (1989) 
Dissociation Model. Using Devine’s model, the racial implications of religious 
orientation can be better addressed.  
Although no other work to date has attempted to investigate religious 
orientation through the lens of Devine’s dissociation model, the suggestion has been 
made. After presenting a pessimistic analysis of intrinsic religion, Batson and Burris 
(1994), citing Devine, wrote:  
Perhaps, stimulated by their religious beliefs and role models, the intrinsically 
religious are in the process of being resocialized (or acculturated) away from 
prejudice, but the resocialization process is not complete. Like trying to break 
a bad habit, they slip back into their old ways when their new, unprejudicial 
thoughts and behaviors are not consciously activated by salient cues (cues 
such as being asked to complete a prejudice questionnaire or act in a way that 
might appear overtly prejudicial). If this impetration is correct, then increasing 
the salience of the antiprejudice norm of the religious community (i.e., 
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consciousness raising) may lead to reduced prejudice by the more intrinsically 
religious even in covert behavior, not just on questionnaires. (1994, p. 167) 
Though Batson and Burris made the suggestion, they made it with doubts. 
They believed the potential for socialization rested on an assumption that the religious 
community actively taught the eschewing of prejudice and discrimination. However, 
rather than leading the community to truly reject racism, such teaching lead them to,  
Suspect that in many cases the intrinsic believer, attending to the practice of 
the religious community as well as the preaching, is being resocialized to a 
very different, more pharisaical norm: The truly religious can’t look racist. 
(1994, p. 167) 
Accordingly, if the religious community actively teaches against prejudice and 
discrimination, intrinsics will not show signs of prejudice reduction, rather they will 
show more concern for social desirability. This doubt, however, fails to note one 
important element of Allport’s conception of intrinsic religion – the personal 
dimension (Allport, 1954; Allport and Ross, 1967). While it is true that the 
community aspect of religion shapes one’s religious views, the intrinsic individual is 
not solely dependent on the community for such views. Following the notion of 
Kierkegaard’s self (1843/1974), there is a very individual notion to genuine faith, 
even apart from the community. Even if the community holds such standards but does 
not regularly and explicitly advocate these standards, personal study and convictions 
might still work to embed these qualities in what Kierkegaard would refer to as the 
authentic and what Allport would consider an intrinsically oriented individual, and 
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what Batson would describe as quest. What happens in the community, provided the 
community does not actively work to undermine such values, would only compliment 
the intrinsic qualities.  
A distinction must also be made in the use of terms. As noted previously, 
Allport and Ross’ (1954) early research found four different categories of religious 
orientation: intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low-religious. Indiscriminantly 
religious respondents were those who recorded high scores on both the intrinsic and 
extrinsic scales, despite seemingly contradictory statements, i.e., “My religious 
beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life” and, “Thought I believe 
in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in my life” (Allport & 
Ross, 1967). Their research demonstrated a significant difference between 
indiscriminantly religious respondents and the intrinsic, extrinsic respondents. 
However, without a distinction in terms, an intrinsic and Indiscriminant would be 
placed in the same category given their response to the intrinsic scale. For the purpose 
of this study, Allport’s four categories will be used to distinguish between intrinsic 
(high intrinsic, low extrinsic scores), extrinsic (low intrinsic, high extrinsic), 
indiscriminant (high intrinsic, high extrinsic), and low-religious (low intrinsic, low 
extrinsic). A fifth category will include quest (low intrinsic, low extrinsic, high quest 
scores).  
Discrepancy 
According to TMT, mortality salience (MS) increases dependence on 
worldview structures in an effort to buffer existential threats (Greenberg et al., 1994; 
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Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999). At the same time, MS leads individuals 
to bolster their worldview against outgroup members who threaten that worldview 
(Greenberg et al., 1990; Greenberg et al., 1992; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). This sets up 
an interesting dilemma within the dissociation model. If the dissociation model 
accounts for the process of breaking prejudicial habits (positive acculturation, or 
resocialization) and not necessarily a finished work, then to what extent will MS 
cause individuals to revert to their more familiar prejudices they are trying to break? 
Using elements of the dissociation model, MS effects can be used to investigate the 
influence of religiosity on prejudice reduction. Likewise, TMT can help further 
identify the process of breaking the prejudice tendency.  
Monteith and Voil’s (1998) Should-Would scale provides a measure of 
discrepancy between how a person should react to issues of prejudice verses how they 
would actually behave. TMT’s influence on discrepancy scores between how a person 
believes he/she should respond and how he/she would respond provides a means to 
observe the degree of commitment towards the CWV, reflecting the degree to which 
the tendency towards prejudice has been overcome. Taken together, the should-would 
scale provides an interesting platform for investigating TMT’s predictions.  
According to TMT, MS heightens the need for the anxiety buffering function 
of one’s CWV (Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). If the CWV includes 
an emphasis on non-prejudiced values, then this ought to be reflected by decreased 
would scores. Under normal circumstance, TMT decreases attraction to outgroups 
(Greenberg et al., 1990; Rosenblatt et al., 1989), therefore, would scores should be 
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expected to increase in the MS condition relative to controls. Thus, MS should lead to 
increased discrepancy. However, if a person’s worldview includes non-prejudiced 
values, then would scores should decrease or remain unaffected to the extent those 
values are made salient.  
 Devine and colleagues have argued that prejudice responses are based on the 
degree to which non-prejudiced values are internalized (Devine et al., 2002; Plant & 
Devine, 1998; Zuwerink et al., 1996). Therefore, the higher degree of non-prejudice 
internalization, the greater commitment to non-prejudiced outlooks should be. 
Similarly, Allport argued that intrinsic religiosity represents a person who lives 
his/her religion whereas an extrinsic person uses his/her religion (Allport, 1967).  
Research has suggested a negative correlation between intrinsic religiosity and 
prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Gorsuch & Alshire, 1974). Jonas 
and Fischer (2006) have shown that intrinsics display lower levels of worldview 
defense following MS. Similarly, Greenberg et al. (1992) demonstrated that priming 
tolerance under MS conditions reduced the level of intolerance among participants. 
However, these findings have been called into question based on the effects of social 
desirability (Batson et al., 1986; Burris & Navara, 2002; Hall, Matz & Wood, 2010; 
Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997). This conflict sets up the potential for 
several hypotheses.  
First, if intrinsic religiosity reduces prejudice, then MS will lead an intrinsic to 
cling to his/her religion (should-scores) by living out his/her religion, in part, by 
reducing prejudice (would-scores). Greenberg et al. (1992) found that individuals 
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who value tolerance become more tolerant after their relevant values were primed 
prior to MS induction. Therefore, if intrinsic religiosity is associated with increased 
tolerance, the following prediction is made:   
H1a: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower should and lower would scores in the 
death condition than in the dental condition.  
If intrinsic religiosity is more concerned with presenting oneself as being 
more righteous than one actually is (Batson et al., 1978, p. 38) then mortality salience 
should expose the discrepancy, causing an increase in discrepancy scores. Therefore, 
the following prediction is made:  
H1b: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower should and higher would scores in 
the death condition than in the dental condition.  
  Research has consistently shown extrinsics demonstrate higher levels of 
prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Gorsuch & Alshire, 1974), 
especially under MS (Jonas & Fischer, 2006). Since extrinsics use their religion for 
safety under threat rather than centering their lives on religious concepts (Allport, 
1954), extrinsics are more likely to perceive outgroups as more threatening than 
intrinsics. MS would therefore heighten the level of threat extrinsics perceive from the 
out-group race, thus increasing their discrepancy scores. Therefore, the following 
prediction is made:  
H2: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower discrepancy scores than extrinsic, 
indiscriminant and low religiosity in the same MS condition.  
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Social desirability refers to the level of concern individuals place on the 
perceptions of others, particularly in survey settings (Crowne & Marlow 1960). 
Participants with high levels of social desirability are often assumed to alter their 
responses to survey questions to be more socially acceptable. Accounting for social 
desirability, Batson et al. (1978) found that decreased levels of racism disappeared for 
intrinsics. Since discrepancy scores are a representation of how participants self-
report they should respond and how they actually would respond, social desirability 
could play a significant role such that participants with high social desirability might 
report more socially approved scores on how they both should and would respond to 
people of a different race. Therefore:   
H3: Social desirability will be negatively correlated with discrepancy.  
According to Baston and Ventis (1985), the quest orientation is characterized 
by an “open-ended, critical struggle with existential questions” (p. 168). Such an 
orientation is also marked by skepticism of absolute answers, and “flexible thinking 
about existential answers” (Batson & Ventis, 1985, p. 169). Quest has reflected 
higher levels of consistency in prejudice reduction (Batson et al., 1976; Batson et al., 
1978) even when social desirability is taken into account (Batson et al., 1978; Batson 
& Ventis, 1985). Greenberg et al. (1992) found that liberals who value tolerance and 
open-mindedness decreased their disliking of dissimilar others when mortality 
salience was primed. Therefore:  
H4: Quest discrepancy scores will be lower than intrinsic, extrinsic, 
indiscriminant, and low religiosity scores in the corresponding MS condition.  
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Compunction 
Also relevant to the present investigation, discrepancy scores provide a 
representation of a person’s consistency between belief and action (Amodio et al., 
2007; Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991) and thus represent the degree to which one 
lives up to worldview beliefs. Any such violations of worldview might be expected to 
challenge one’s self-esteem, which is essential in buffering existential anxiety 
(Greenberg et al., 1995; Landau et al., 2004; Rosenblatt et al., 1989; Schimel et al., 
1999). As such, greater discrepancy scores would correlate with greater violations. 
These violations, however, would be greater for those who have higher levels of 
worldview internalization (Devine et al., 2002).  
Compunction is the negative affect associated with violations of internalized 
standards (Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993; Zuwerink et al., 
1996). Primarily, it is the feeling of personal guilt at the realization that one has 
violated his/her worldview standards, similar to Higgins’ SDT notion of committing 
an ought own/actual own self-discrepancy resulting in guilt, or an ought other/actual 
own self-discrepancy resulting in shame. Research has shown that compunction 
increases as a result of increased discrepancy scores among people with highly 
internalized standards of non-prejudice, and serves as a predictor of interest in 
prejudice-reducing behavior (Amodio et al., 2007; Monteith & Voil, 1998).  
Since MS increases the need for worldview buffering against death, then any 
discrepancy should represent a departure from worldview standards and a potential 
decrease in and need for boosting self-esteem. The greater degree of worldview 
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internalization, the greater the level of compunction that should result when violations 
occur. MS should therefore be expected to amplify such violations, creating a need to 
bolster worldview and/or self-esteem in order to buffer the resulting existential 
threats.  
If intrinsic religiosity is instrumental in the reduction of prejudice, then 
intrinsics should feel increased compunction in the MS condition. Since extrinsic, 
indiscriminant, and low-religiosity hold religion less internally, such violations 
should have a significantly lesser effect on compunction.  
H5a: Intrinsic religiosity will have higher compunction scores in the death 
condition than in the dental condition.  
H5b: High discrepancy scores will be associated with higher compunction 
scores for intrinsic religiosity than for extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low 
religiosity in the same MS condition.  
The quest orientation consists of an open-ended, questioning view of religion 
(Batson & Venis, 1982; Batson et al., 1999). Batson et al. (1999) linked such open-
endedness with a higher sense of universal compassion. This pattern held even when 
participants evaluated a person who violated the values of open-mindedness (Batson 
et al., 2001). The increased compassion of quest religiosity stems from the open-
endedness, which does not require certainty toward any doctrine (Vail et al., 2009). 
Therefore, those who hold a different worldview should potentially be viewed as less 
threatening. Given a commitment to universal compassion, any such violation (i.e., 
discrepancy) should lead to increased levels of compunction. Since such a violation 
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represents a direct threat to quest’s self-perception, the compunction affect should be 
greater.  
H6: When controlling for discrepancy scores, compunction scores will be 
greater for quest religiosity than for intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and 
low religiosity in the same MS condition.  
Death Anxiety 
Discrepancy reflects the inability to live up to the should-standards defined by 
a particular CWV. Such violations according to TMT would represent a threat to self-
esteem (Landau et al., 2004; Greenberg, Simon, Porteus, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 
1995; Rosenblatt, 1989; Schimel et al., 1999). Since MS increases the need for self-
esteem to buffer existential anxiety, increased discrepancy should be associated with 
greater death anxiety. Anxiety buffering effects associated with self-esteem 
bolstering, are contingent upon individuals’ ability to live up to the dictates of their 
worldview. Therefore:  
H7: Discrepancy scores will be positively correlated with death anxiety.  
Similarly, Allport (1967; 1966) suggested that intrinsics should show less 
anxiety about death. Research provides some evidence in support of Allport’s 
prediction by showing negative correlations between intrinsic scores and death-
anxiety (Batson & Ventis, 1982; Donahue, 1985; Vail et al., 2009). Vail et al., (2009) 
suggested that intrinsic religiosity is an effective tool of terror management. 
However, if intrinsics perceive they have violated their internalized worldview, this 
violation should be more significant to them relative to those with less internalized 
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religiosity. If these discrepancies represent a violation of worldview expectations, the 
buffering effects the worldview should diminish, increasing an intrinsics’ death 
anxiety.  
H8: Intrinsic religiosity and high compunction scores will have higher levels 
of death anxiety than extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low-religiosity with high 
compunction scores.  
Batson’s quest orientation conceptualizes a “critical struggle with existential 
questions” (Batson & Ventis, 1982, p. 169). As such, the quest orientation should lead 
to decreased levels of death anxiety in general, though published research has not 
directly addressed this issue. Indirectly, TMT would suggest the consistency of quest 
to show compassion towards those of differing worldviews is reflective of the strong 
buffering structure of the quest orientation. This suggests that, when controlling for 
discrepancy and compunction scores, those with quest orientations should show 
decreased levels of death anxiety when their mortality is made salient.  
H9: Controlling for discrepancy and compunction scores quest religiosity will 
have lower levels of death anxiety than intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and 
low religiosity.  
Research Questions 
 The differences in religious orientation assumes that religion operates 
differently from person to person. While research has shown an ability to boost 
religious awareness (Friedman & Rhodes, 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2009; Rothchild, 
Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009), only one study to date has attempted to specifically 
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boost intrinsic or extrinsic religiosity but with no significant results (Carpenter and 
Marshall’s (2009). The ability to prime relevant religious orientations allows for 
stronger causal claims to be established. Therefore, the following three research 
questions are posed:  
RQ1: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation 
have on self-esteem?  
RQ2: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation 
have on discrepancy scores?  
RQ3: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation 
hav eon death anxiety?  
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Chapter 3:  Participants and Method 
The present study took place in two phases conducted an average of three 
days apart. A total of N = 387 undergraduates from a private Christian University in 
the Midwest completed the first phase online using Qualtrics Research Suite in 
exchange for course credit. Additionally, N = 511 participants volunteered to 
complete phase 1 through MTURK also using Qualtrics Research Suite for a payment 
of $1.50. Subsequently, N = 183 of the undergraduates (for course credit), and N = 
375 MTURK participants (for a payment of $3.50) returned to complete Phase 2.  
 MTURK participants completed both phases online in their own setting. 
University participants completed Phase 1 online in their own setting and completed 
Phase 2 in an on-campus lab. To replicate the method predominantly used in most 
TMT studies, rather than computer administered, the university participants 
completed their MS priming materials, distractor tasks, and word stem completion 
tasks via paper/pencil, and these data were later manually entered into SPSS. At the 
beginning of Phase 2, university participants were given a randomly generated ID 
number via Qualtrics and asked to write the number on the first page of their survey 
packets. After completing the priming, distraction, and word stem tasks, university 
participants returned to the online survey to complete Phase 2. For both samples, 
Phase 1 and 2 results were linked using email addresses and MTURK worker IDs as 
appropriate. Once both phases were combined, email addresses and MTURK IDs 
were deleted from the final dataset to help assure confidentiality.  
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Materials and Procedure 
After completing a consent form, all Phase 1 participants filled out a bank of 
questions made up of demographic information, measures of attitudes toward Blacks 
(for non-Blacks) or attitudes toward Whites (for Blacks), the Motivation to Respond 
without Prejudice scale, a self-esteem scale, a social desirability scale, and the 
Religious Orientation Scale (See Appendix A). Religious orientations were measured 
last to ensure responses did not affect prejudice scores. At the end of Phase 1, 
university participants selected a date and time to return to an on-campus lab to 
complete Phase 2 of the study. Each participant was contacted via email one day prior 
to their scheduled time to remind them of their appointment. MTURK participants 
completed Phase 1 and, after 3 days, were given approval to complete Phase 2, 
whereupon they voluntarily returned to complete Phase 2.  
Phase 2 participants logged onto Qualtrics and were asked to give consent to 
the information describing the study. Following the consent form participants 
received either an intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, indiscriminate or low religiosity message 
and asked to indicate the degree to which the message described them using a 1 (a not 
like me at all) to 5 (just like me) scale.  
 Participants were randomly assigned to receive either the traditional MS 
prime or the dental pain control prime (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997) in which they 
were asked to respond to two questions:  (1) “Please briefly describe the emotions 
that the thought of your own death [or going to the dentist] arouses in you” and (2) 
“Jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen to you [as you are 
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at the dentist’s office] and once you are physically dead” [or experience dental pain]. 
After receiving the MS prime/control manipulation, participants completed the 
PANAS scale, then read an expert from The Growing Stone, a brief reading used in 
traditional TMT research as a distractor task, and a word-stem completion as a 
manipulation check. University participants completed the MS prime, distraction 
tasks, and word-stem completion task in paper/pencil form before returning to the 
online portion of the survey. Participants then completed the Should-Would- 
Discrepancy scale, Compunction Affect indices, the Self-Discrepancy Affect indices 
and the State Shame and Guilt Scale. Finally, participants completed the Templer 
Death Anxiety Scale, after which they were debriefed and thanked.  
Measures: Phase 1 
Attitudes Toward Blacks (ATB). The ATB (White’s Attitude Toward Blacks) 
is a 20-item scale developed by Brigham (1993) to measure racial attitudes among 
college students (see Appendix A). The scale consists of 10 positively worded items 
and 10 negatively worded items. No more than 4 of the 20 items were taken from any 
single factor based on a factor analyses. Factors include social distance, affective 
reactions, governmental policy, and personal worry. For instance, participants are 
asked to respond to the statement, “I get very upset when I hear a White make a 
prejudicial remark about Blacks”. Responses are based on a seven item scale where 1 
= strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. Responses were averaged together with 
higher scores indicating more positive attitudes toward Blacks. The ATB 
demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha = .90. 
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Attitudes Toward Whites (ATW). Brigham (1993) developed a companion 
survey to the ATB for use with Black respondents (see Appendix A). For the purpose 
of this study, participants indicating “Black” as their race were directed, via Qualtrics 
to complete the ATW in place of the ATB. The scale takes into consideration the 
distinctions between Black and White struggles by measuring such issues as, “Most 
Whites can’t understand what it’s like to be black” (see Appendix A). The ATW is a 
20-item scale answered on a 7-point differential (1=strongly disagree to 7 = strongly 
agree). The ATW demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha = .65. 
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice (IMS, EMS). The IMS/EMS was 
developed by Plant and Devine (1998) to identify whether a person’s motivation to 
respond without prejudice is based on internal or external factors (see Appendix A). 
Both the IMS and EMS consist of 5 items rated on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 
(strongly agree) on such questions as, “I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people 
because of pressure from others” (see Appendix A). The IMS demonstrated a 
Cronbach’s alpha = .91 and the EMS had a Cronbach’s alpha = .89.  
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice - Black (IMS-B, EMS-B). The 
IMS and EMS reflect the perspective of White participants. In order to utilize 
responses from Black participants in this study, elements of the IMS and EMS 
reflecting a White perspective have been reworded to reflect a Black perspective. 
This alteration consisted of reversing the terms “White” to “Black”. For instance, 
where the EMS stated, “I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of 
pressure from others”, the term “Black” was changed to read “White” (see Appendix 
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A). The IMS-B and the EMS-B was administered in place of the IMS and EMS to 
participants indicating their race as “Black.” The IMS-B demonstrated a Cronbach’s 
alpha = .89 and the EMS demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha = .84. 
Social Desirability. Social Desirability was measured using the Marlow-
Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Marlowe & Crowne, 1960). The scale measures 
the need a person has to secure social and cultural approval from others. The 33-item 
scale is comprised of true/false questions which are scaled by dummy coding (T = 1, 
F = 0) responses and averaging across responses (see Appendix A). Sample questions 
include, “I have never intensely disliked anyone” and, “I like to gossip at times.”  
Higher scores indicate higher levels of social desirability. The social desirability scale 
demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha = .84.  
Religious Orientation (RO). Since Allport and Ross’ (1967) original 
Religious Orientation scale, multiple changes have been suggested by scholars. 
Gorsuch and McPherson’s (1989) 14 item I/E-Revised scale was used in this study 
because of its incorporation of two primary updates (see Appendix A). First, wording 
of the scale facilitates the measurement of intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity among adults 
and schoolchildren (Forsuch & Venable, 1983). Second, the scale retains items used 
in the original scale while suggesting three distinct factors: intrinsic, extrinsic 
personal (religion as a source of personal comfort) and extrinsic social (religion as a 
social benefit) (Kirkpatrick, 1989). A five-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), was used with higher scores indicating increased 
levels of each subscale. Sample questions include, “I enjoy reading about my 
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religion” intrinsic), and “Although I am religious, I don’t let it affect my daily life” 
(extrinsic). Both scales showed strong reliability (intrinsic: Cronbach’s alpha = .81; 
extrinsic: Cronbach’s alpha = .84. 
Quest Orientation. Quest Orientation was measured using Batson and 
Schoenrade’s (1991) updated 11-item scale. The Quest Scale is subdivided into three 
factors: readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity, self-
criticism and perception of religious doubt as positive, and openness to change. The 
scale includes such question as, “My life experiences have led me to rethink my 
religious convictions” and “For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to 
be religious” (See Appendix A). Responses were based on a five-point scale ranging 
from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (5). The Quest scale showed strong 
reliability, Cronbach’s alpha = .84. 
Using mean scores of the three religious orientation scales (intrinsic, extrinsic, 
quest), participants were grouped into one of five religious orientations: intrinsic, 
extrinsic, quest, indiscriminant, and low religiosity. The grouping was based on 
participants scoring above the scale mean of 3 and then grouped based on the highest 
mean score.  If a participant scored below the scale mean of 3 on all three 
orientations, they were placed in the low religiosity group. If participants scored 
within .1 of the mean on two or more orientations, they were classified as 
indiscriminant.  
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Measures: Phase 2 
 Self-Esteem Measure (SE). Self-esteem was measured using the Rosenberg 
Self-esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), a 10-item scale using a 4-point differential 
format ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree (see Appendix B). Sample 
questions include such items as, “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”, and “I 
certainly feel useless at times”. The scale has been used in multiple TMT studies with 
acceptable reliability (see Greenberg, et al., 1992; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). The 
Self-esteem scale showed good reliability, Cronbach’s alpha = .79. 
   MS Prime: Traditional TMT research has used the Projective Life Attitude 
Assessment to prime thoughts of mortality (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). The prime consists of two open ended questions to 
which participants are asked to respond with their “gut reaction” (i.e., “Please briefly 
describe the emotions that the thought of your own death arouses in you” and “Jot 
down, as specifically as you can, what you think happens to you as you physically die 
and once you are physically dead). A control condition replaces “death” and “dead” 
with “dental pain”. 
 PANAS. The PANAS is a 20-item affect scale that measures positive and 
negative emotions such as “interested”, “distressed”, “guilty” etc. (with a 5-point 
scale from 1=very slightly or not at all to 5= extremely applicable) (Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1986; see Appendix B). The scale has been used in previous TMT research 
immediately following mortality salience manipulation to monitor the potential 
effects of the mortality salience (Greenberg et al., 1992) and to act as a delay.  
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 Word-Stem Completion. The Word-Stem Completion was used in TMT 
research to serve as a delay and manipulation check measuring death thought 
accessibility (Harmon-Jones, et al., 1997). The task consists of 25 word fragments 
with six potential death-related words (i.e., BUR_ _ D, for BURIED) and 19 serving 
as fillers (see Appendix B). The questionnaire is scored by simply adding up the 
number of death-related word completions.    
Should-Would Discrepancy. The Should-Would Discrepancy index was 
developed by Monteith and Voils (1998) in an effort to measure how participants 
believe they should respond to different racial situations and then how they would 
respond to racial situations. The scale also indicates “that individuals are able and 
willing to provide explicit reports that correspond to their actual prejudiced 
tendencies or lack thereof” and that such reports are “authentic and do reflect 
people’s proneness to engaging in prejudiced responses that violate their personal 
standards” (Monteith & Voils, 1998, p. 911). The should and would indexes each 
contain 16 questions with responses ranging from 1 (strong disagreement) to 7 (strong 
agreement). Sample questions include such items as, “I sometimes have stereotypical 
racial thoughts” (would item) and “I should go out of my way to avoid passing a 
Black person on the street” (see Appendix B).  Descrepency scores were then 
calculated by subtracting corresponding questions on the would scale from those on 
the should scale. The should scale showed a Cronbach’s alpha = .93. The would scale 
had a Cronbach’s alpha = .911. The discrepancy scale show a Cronbach’s alpha = .69.  
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Should-Would Discrepancy– B. The Should-Would Discrepancy index 
reflects White perspectives towards Blacks. In order to include data from Black 
participants, the Discrepancy – B index alters the language of the original 
Discrepancy index to reflect Black perspectives toward Whites (see Appendix B). 
Alterations consisted only of exchanging the words “Black” and “White”. For 
instance, where the original Discrepancy statement read, “I go out of my way to avoid 
passing a Black person on the street”, the term “Black” was replaced with the term, 
“White”). The Discrepancy-B will be administered in place of the original 
Discrepancy to participants indicating their race as “Black.” 
Compunction. Compunction is measured using the Compunction Affect 
Indices (Devine, et al., 1991) as used by Monteith (1993). The scale consists of 33 
affect-related words or phrases to which participants indicate the level to which each 
words applies to their feelings at the moment using a 1 (does not apply at all) to 7 
(applies very much) scale (see Appendix B). Compunction scores are based on 
responses to eight of the words and phrases, “angry at myself”, “guilty”, “annoyed at 
myself”, “regretful”, “disappointed with myself”, “disgusted with myself”, “shame” 
and “self-critical”. The compunction scale showed a Cronbach’s alpha = .89.  
Guilt/Shame: Tagney and Dearing’s (2002) State Shame and Guilt Scale 
(SSGS) will be used to provide a second measure of negative affect. The scale 
consists of 15 short statements to which respondents express feeling “right now” 
using a 5-point scale. Example statements include, “I feel good about myself”, “I feel 
proud”, and “I feel worthless, powerless” (see Appendix B). The scale consists of 
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three subscales (Shame, Guilt, Pride) each consisting of 5 items. The State Shame and 
Guilt Scale demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha = .91.  
Death Anxiety: Death anxiety was measured using Templer’s (1972) 15-item 
scale. The scale consists of true and false questions such as, “I am very much afraid to 
die” and “I fear dying a painful death” (see Appendix B). The Templer scale 
demonstrated a Cronbach’s alpha = .80. 
Power Analysis 
An a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power to determine the 
number of participants needed to find a small effect size (.15) with 80% power using 
an ANOVA. Results showed the need for N = 540 for five groups (N = 108 per 
group). A similar analysis was conducted to determine the number of participants 
needed to find a small effect size (.15) with 80% power using an ANCOVA. Results 
showed the need for a sample size of 351 (N = 70 per group).  
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Chapter 4: Results 
Prior to the main analyses, data for participants completing only Phase 1 were 
eliminated from the data set (university N = 209, MTURK N = 151). Whereupon 
those who had completed all Phase 2 response items w/o missing data were coded as 
such, and t-tests of race, gender, religious orientation and ATW/ATB were run 
comparing them to participants who had shown some missing responses. 
Subsequently, random distribution of missing data was insured by nonsignificant 
results on all tests. 
Duration time for phase two was used to clean and filter out participants with 
excessively short or long duration. Phase 2 was of special concern given the use of 
priming and delay materials (Pyszczynski et al. 1999). Phase 2 duration was also 
important because data were collected using online/lab (university N = 183) and 
online only (MTURK, N = 375) methods. These data were examined for duration and 
found to range between 7 and 13647 minutes (M = 120.16, SD = 880.51, skew = 
11.39, kurtosis = 144.12). Whereupon 13 outliers, all of which showed excessive 
scores of more than 100 minutes, were deleted leaving a reduced dataset of N = 543, 
with responses found to range between 7 and 82 minutes (M = 22.46, SD = 9.15, 
skew = 1.82, kurtosis = 7.03). Additionally, to allow enough time for priming, delay 
and completion of the survey, participants with duration scores below 11 minutes (N 
= 16) were deleted, as were participants more than three standard deviations above 
the mean (49.75 minutes, N = 7). This resulted in a dataset of N = 520 (M = 22.33, 
SD = 7.54, skew = .85, kurtosis = .44), which was deemed suitable for analysis.  
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Since the primary focus of the present research concerned racial attitudes 
toward Blacks, and black participants completed different should, and would scales, 
Black participants (N = 44) were coded so that their data could be identified within 
the primary dataset. 
University participants consisted of N = 179 (84 males, 94 females, 1 missing) 
with a mean age of 20.47 (SD = 3.60) ranging from 18 to 60. The educational levels 
reported for university students were: freshman (40), sophomore (60), junior (26), 
senior (52) and one participant failing to report educational level. University 
participants also represented a diversity of race/ethnicity: white (134), black (16) 
Asian/pacific islander (11), American Indian/Alaskan Native (9), and Hispanic (7). 
MTURK participants consisted of N = 360 (193 males, 167 females) with a mean age 
of 34.53 (SD = 10.04) ranging from 18 to 60. The educational levels reported for 
MTURK participants were: freshman (10), sophomore (19), junior (14), senior (18), 
graduate student (21), college graduate (155), no college (122), and one participant 
failing to report educational level. MTURK participants also represented a diversity 
of race/ethnicity made up of white (273), black (26), Asian/pacific islander (32), 
Hispanic (25) and one reporting Middle Eastern descent.  
As anticipated, participants taken from the private Christian university 
identified more prominently as Christian (N =172) than MTURK participants (N = 
157). Likewise, the MTURK sample contained more participants describing 
themselves as Atheist (N = 78) or Agnostic (N = 95) compared to participants from 
the private Christian school, (Atheist, N = 1, Agnostic, N = 3). One University 
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participant reported holding eastern religious convictions and no University 
participants reported Muslim or Jewish convictions. The MTURK population 
reported Muslim (5) and Jewish (14) convictions.  
Prior to testing the hypothesis analysis was conducted to determine potential 
differences between Black and non-Black participants on a number of variables. 
Independent samples t-tests indicated non-significant differences between Black and 
non-Black participants on three important variables in this study: social desirability, 
compunction, and death anxiety. However, independent samples t-tests did indicate a 
significant difference on discrepancy means between Black (M = -.33, SD = .75) and 
non-Black participants (M = .67, SD = .64), t(518) =  9.57, p < .0001. An additional t-
test comparing should  and would scores revealed a significant difference only for 
should scores, t(537) = 6.941, p < .0001 such that Blacks reported they should show 
higher levels of racism (N= 42, M = 3.03, SD 1.15) than Whites (N = 497, M = 1.94, 
SD = .96). The nature of this difference however, may indicate problems with the 
should and would measures.  
As noted by Monteith and Voils (1998) a negative discrepancy score suggests 
the questionable scenario wherein the participants would act more positively toward a 
person of a different race than they believed they should. The negative mean for 
Black discrepancy scores therefore raises concerns. Further, this negative mean may 
be attributed to the nature of the questions themselves. The original discrepancy scale 
was designed for non-Black participants. For the purpose of this study, the terms 
“Black” and “White” were reversed to make the scales seemingly appropriate for 
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Black participants. Given the nature of the questions, this inadvertently led to some 
questions portraying Whites as the minority. For instance, “I support Whites in their 
struggle against discrimination” suggests whites are the oppressed minority. This 
impression was given to at least one participant who, when prompted to provide 
feedback to the survey before logging off, wrote, “I feel very offended as a black 
student participating in the study. Some of the questions made it seem like white 
people were the minority, not the majority and that isn’t true.” Given these concerns, 
Black participant responses were not used in the primary analysis of the hypothesis 
and research questions to follow.  
The extant TMT research has primarily relied on a word stem completion task 
to indicate death thought awareness. The word stem task used in this study consisted 
of the same six death related words (buried, dead, grave, killed, skull, and coffin) 
used in other TMT research. Participants who completed the blanks to form a death 
related word received a score of “1” for such entries, and participants who completed 
the blanks with a non-death word received a score of “0” for such entries. Scores 
were then summed across all six death-thought words to create a “word stem score.” 
To evaluate whether participants receiving the death prime identified more death 
related words than participants in the control condition, an independent-samples t-test 
was conducted with the MS/control conditions as the IV and word stem scores as the 
DV. Although mean scores moved in the expected direction (death = 1.85, dental = 
1.75) the test was not significant, t(478) = -.942, p = .35. A similar t-test was 
performed with just the student sample for those who completed the prime, 
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distraction task, and word stem materials using the traditional paper/pencil method. 
However, results again showed scores moved in the expected direction (death = 1.86, 
dental, 1.82), but failed to be significant, t(150) = -1.92), p = .85. 
Hypothesis Testing 
H1a: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower should and lower would scores in the death 
condition than in the dental condition. 
H1b: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower should and higher would scores in the death 
condition than in the dental condition.  
H1a and H1b were tested using an independent samples t-test comparing 
intrinsic should scores between the two MS conditions (death, dental). No support 
was found for H1a or H1b. Differences in should scores between the death (M = 1.89, 
SD = 1.0) and dental (M = 1.9, SD = .67) (see Table 1) conditions were found not to 
be statistically significant, t(165 ) =. 08, p = .94.  
No support for H1a or H1b was found for would scores. An independent 
samples t-test comparing intrinsic would scores in the death (M = 2.73, SD = 1.1) and 
dental (M = 2.9, SD = .93) conditions (see Table 1) was non-significant, t(165) = 
1.07, p = .29  
Table 1  
Should and would means for Intrinsic religiosity based on MS condition 
Scale MS Condition N M SD 
Should 
 
 
Would 
Dental 
Death 
 
Dental  
Death 
83 
84 
 
83 
84 
1.90 
1.89 
 
2.90 
2.73 
.67 
1.00 
 
.93 
1.09 
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* Means differences between dental and death conditions for both should and would 
scores were non-significant at p < .05 
 
H2: Intrinsic religiosity will have lower discrepancy scores than extrinsic, 
indiscriminant and low-religiosity in the same MS condition. 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) examining discrepancy scores across 
religiosity (intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity) produced no support 
for H2 in the death condition, F(3, 174) = 1.04, p = .38, η2 = .02 (see Table 2).  
Table 2  
Discrepancy means for religiosity in death and dental conditions.  
Religiosity MS Condition N M SD 
Intrinsic 
 
 
Extrinsic 
 
 
Quest 
 
 
Indiscriminate 
 
 
Low 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
84 
83 
 
17 
15 
 
62 
60 
 
17 
16 
 
60 
61 
.69 
   .83** 
 
.68 
.56 
 
.79 
.71 
 
.72 
    .54** 
 
.51 
.41 
.72 
.67 
 
.65 
.64 
 
.69 
.48 
 
.81 
.52 
 
.51 
.63 
Note: * Denotes a significant mean difference between intrinsic and indiscriminant 
scores in the dental condition at p < .01. 
 
A one-way ANOVA showed a statistically significant difference in discrepancy 
scores among religious orientation in the dental condition, F(3, 171) = 5.9, p = .001, η2= 
.09 (See Table 3).  A Bonferroni post hoc analysis showed intrinsic discrepancy means 
(M = .83, SD = .67) were significantly higher than low religiosity discrepancy  
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means (M = .41, SD = .52), p < .0001. The difference in discrepancy scores between 
intrinsic and low religiosity were in the opposite direction of the predicted means.  
Table 3 
F-Distribution for discrepancy means for intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low 
religiosity. 
 Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Eta-
Squared 
 
Between 
Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
6.43 
62.15 
68.68 
3 
171 
174 
2.14 
.36 
5.89 .001 .09 
 
H3: Social desirability will be negatively correlated with discrepancy.  
A bivariate correlation produced support for H3 showing a statistically 
significant negative correlation between social desirability and discrepancy scores, 
r(473) = -.153,  p = .001 showing an increase in social desirability is related to a 
decrease in discrepancy scores.  
 
H4: Quest discrepancy scores will be lower than intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, 
and low religiosity scores in the corresponding MS condition. 
A two-way ANOVA comparing discrepancy scores across religious 
orientation and MS conditions showed a significant main effect for religiosity, F(4, 
475) = 4.61, p = .001, η2 = .04. No main effect was found for MS condition, F(1, 475) 
= .80, p = .37, η2 = .002, and no interaction effect was found, F(4, 475) = 1.03. p = 
.39, η2 = .01.  A Bonferroni post hoc analysis for the MS effect revealed significantly 
higher scores for intrinsic (M = .76, SD = .05) than low religiosity (M = .46, SD = 
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.11), p = .001. Scores for quest religiosity (M = .75, SD = .06) were also significantly 
higher than low religiosity low religiosity (M = .46, SD = .11), p = .004. Scores for 
intrinsic and quest religiosity moved opposite from the predicted mean.  
 
H5a: Intrinsic religiosity will show higher compunction scores in the death condition 
than in the dental condition.  
No support for H5a was found using an independent samples t-test comparing 
intrinsic compunction scores between death (M = 2.49, SD = 1.55) and dental (M = 
2.6, SD = 1.5) conditions (see Table 4). Results of the t-test were found not to be 
statistically significant, t(165) = .31, p  = .76. 
 
 H5b: High discrepancy scores will be associated with higher compunction scores for 
intrinsic religiosity than for extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the same 
MS condition.  
A dichotomous variable was created for discrepancy scores using a mean split 
(M = .66, SD = .65) resulting in low discrepancy (N = 258) and high discrepancy (N 
= 217). A two-way ANOVA showed no main effect for either MS, F(1, 217) = .11, p 
= .74, ηp
2
 = .00, or religiosity, F(4, 217) = 1.26, p = .29, ηp
2
 = .02 (see Table 4). The 
two-way ANOVA also failed to show a significant interaction effect, F(4, 217) = 
1.17, p = .33, ηp
2
= .02. Therefore, no support was found for H5b. 
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Table 4 
Compunction means for of religiosity across death and dental conditions.  
Religiosity MS Condition N M SD 
Intrinsic 
 
 
Extrinsic 
 
 
Quest 
 
 
Indiscriminate 
 
 
Low 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
 
Death 
Dental 
84 
83 
 
17 
15 
 
62 
60 
 
17 
16 
 
60 
61 
2.49 
2.56 
 
2.24 
2.80 
 
2.65 
2.55 
 
2.53 
2.11 
 
1.87 
2.20 
1.55 
1.50 
 
1.38 
1.93 
 
1.36 
1.39 
 
1.56 
1.10 
 
1.26 
1.38 
* No significance found at p < .05. 
H6: When controlling for discrepancy scores, compunction scores will be greater for 
quest religiosity than for intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the 
same MS condition.  
A two way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) yielded no support for H6. No 
main effect was found for either religiosity, F(4, 475) = 1.56, p = .18, η2 =.01, or MS, 
F(1, 475) = .57, p = .45, η2 =.00.  The interaction effect was likewise non-significant, 
F(4, 475) = .93, p = .45, η2 = .01. 
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H7: Discrepancy scores will be positively correlated with death anxiety.  
A bivariate correlation provided support for H7 by showing a small but 
significant positive correlation between discrepancy and death anxiety, r(475) = .18, p  
<  .001  such that an increase in discrepancy led to an increase in death anxiety.  
 
H8: Intrinsic religiosity and high compunction scores will have higher levels of death 
anxiety than extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low-religiosity with high compunction 
scores.  
A dichotomous variable was created using a median split of compunction 
scores to create high and low compunction scores. A two-way ANOVA using 
religiosity and high/low compunction yielded no significant interaction effect, F(3, 
345) = .39, p = .76 (see Table 5). 
Table 5 
Death anxiety scores for religious orientation based on a mean split of compunction 
scores. 
Religiosity Compunction N M SD 
Intrinsic 
 
 
Extrinsic 
 
 
Quest 
 
 
Indiscriminate 
 
 
Low 
Low 
High 
 
Low 
High 
 
Low 
High 
 
Low 
High 
 
Low 
High 
102 
65 
 
20 
12 
 
67 
55 
 
21 
28 
 
93 
28 
7.44 
8.71 
 
7.15 
9.5 
 
7.52 
9.44 
 
8.14 
9.04 
 
6.98 
7.45 
3.09 
3.22 
 
4.50 
2.32 
 
3.82 
3.73 
 
3.18 
4.03 
 
3.83 
3.96 
* No significance found at p < .05. 
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H9: Controlling for discrepancy and compunction scores, quest religiosity will have 
lower levels of death anxiety than intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminant, and the low-
religiosity. 
  A one-way ANCOVA yielded no support for H9. After controlling for 
compunction and discrepancy, no main effect was found for religiosity, F(4, 468) = 
.93, p = .45. 
Research Questions 
To investigate the potential impact on relevant religiosity primes, a variable 
labeled “relevance” was created with participants receiving a priming message 
matching their religious orientation grouping scoring “1” (N = 351) and participants 
receiving a priming message different than their religious orientation receiving  a “0” 
(N = 124). As expected, an independent samples t-test revealed participants receiving 
a relevant religious orientation message showed a higher level of agreement with the 
message (M = 3.77, SD = 1.15) than participants receiving a differing religious boost 
(M = 3.3, SD = 1.13), t (471) = -3.92,   p <  .0001. Religiosity and relevance were 
then used as grouping variables to investigate the following research questions.  
 
RQ1: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on 
self-esteem?  
A two-way ANOVA with religiosity and relevance as independent variables 
and self-esteem scores as the dependent variable yielded a statistically non-significant 
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main effect, F(4, 475) = 1.66, p = .16, ηp
2
= .01. Results appear to indicate that 
priming relevant components of religious orientation may not effect self-esteem.  
 
RQ2: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on 
discrepancy scores?  
A two-way ANOVA with religiosity and relevance as independent variables 
and discrepancy as the dependent variable yielded a statistically non-significant 
interaction effect, F(4, 475) = .48, p = .75 ηp
2
= .00. Results indicate that priming 
relevant components of religious orientation appears to have no effect on discrepancy 
scores.  
 
RQ3: What effect does priming relevant components of religious orientation have on 
death anxiety?  
A two-way ANOVA with religiosity and relevance as independent variables 
and discrepancy as the dependent variable yielded a statistically non-significant 
interaction effect, F(4, 465) = .67, p = .61, ηp
2
 = .01. Results indicate that priming 
relevant components of religious orientation appears to have no effect on discrepancy 
scores.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The present research investigates what Allport (1954) considered the 
paradoxical role of religion as it relates to race. Using TMT as a framework for 
understanding why people view other races more positively or negatively, 
dissociation research was also used to investigate the potential affective impact of 
CWV violations and the resulting effects on death anxiety. By blending TMT, 
religious orientation and dissociation research a potentially clearer view of the 
paradox may emerge.  
Of particular interest is the role of religiosity in racial prejudice toward 
Blacks. Allport and Ross (1967) found that intrinsic religiosity served to reduce 
prejudiced thoughts while extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low levels of religiosity 
contributed to racism. Batson et al. (1978) questioned Allport and Ross’ (1967) 
findings that intrinsic religiosity led to decreased racism. Batson et al.’s (1978) work 
linked intrinsic religiosity to higher levels of social desirability and argued intrinsics 
were more concerned with the appearance of decreased racism than an actual 
decrease. Batson argued instead that quest religiosity was a more stable and effective 
religiosity in decreasing racism.  
Using the mortality salience (MS) concept from TMT, discrepancy, 
compunction, and death anxiety provide another perspective through which religion 
and race can be examined. Devine (1989) argued that an individual may show a 
concern for social desirability issues, and may even exhibit prejudice habits. 
However, whenever such exhibits of prejudice are found within a person holding non-
76 
 
prejudiced values, a sense of guilt or compunction results from the discrepancy. TMT 
suggests violations of a person’s worldview decreases the buffering effects against 
the terror of death. Therefore, when taken together, discrepancy, compunction, and 
death anxiety may offer a glimpse into the degree to which non-prejudiced values are 
part of religiosity. These issues are addressed in the discussion of hypothesis testing.  
Mortality Salience 
For the present study, the impact of the TMT predicted mortality salience 
manipulation proved to be inconsistent. First, as noted in the results, the traditional 
word-stem completion task failed to demonstrate a significant difference between 
participants in the death (M = 1.83, SD = 1.10) and dental conditions (M = 1.75, SD = 
1.08). As has been the case with some prior TMT research, these results may be more 
a function to the word-stem completion task’s insensitivity as a manipulation check 
rather than the MS manipulation necessarily being ineffective. For the MS 
manipulation itself, participants in both conditions were prompted to respond to two 
open-ended questions with respect to their priming conditions, and results showed 
every participant wrote a minimum of one sentence for each response. Thus, since it 
is clear that all participants attended to the MS/dental primes, it is assumed the failure 
to show a significant difference in means on the word-stem completion task was 
likely due to the ineffectiveness of the manipulation check—possibly due to a number 
of issues, such as previous exposure to a similar task, spelling abilities, or other 
conditions beyond the control of this study.  
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In some cases, significant differences appeared between the death and dental 
conditions. For instance, a significant result for H2 was found in the dental condition 
showing intrinsics having lower discrepancy scores (M = .83, SD = .67) than low 
religious participants (M = .54, SD = .52). Such results were not found in the death 
condition.  
Part of the inconsistency concerning mortality salience might also be 
attributable to the processes of proximal and distal defense predicted by TMT. To 
achieve effective distal defense, previous research suggests an ideal delay of at least 6 
minutes (Burke et al., 2009). For the present study, the length of delay was only 
estimated secondarily based on duration times in Phase 2, with duration time of less 
than 11 minutes removed from the data. Even among participants with longer 
duration times, it was impossible to estimate the amount of time delay experienced 
following the MS prime given the inability to identify the length of time in any area 
of the study. Therefore, it is possible that participants were unable to remove death 
thoughts from focal awareness during subsequent portions of the study, thus 
remaining in proximal defense, and eliminating the potential for distal defense.  
Religiosity and Race 
Even with the above noted inconsistency, several interesting observations 
emerge from the data. The present study sought to identify potential differences 
between types of religiosity and reactions to questions of race. Allport’s work sought 
a more precise understanding of religiosity which he later labeled intrinsic and 
extrinsic religiosity. Results from Allport and Ross (1967) showed intrinsic religiosity 
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was linked with decreased racism while extrinsic religiosity correlated with increased 
racism. The present research found partial replication of Allport and Ross’ (1967) 
findings showing intrinsics were less prejudiced than extrinsics (see table). Excluding 
quest religiosity to replicate Allport and Ross’ early work (1967), an ANOVA 
comparing ATB scores across religiosity groups produced significant results, F(3, 
352) = 2.94,  p = .03. LSD post hoc analysis revealed extrinsics (M = 4.93, SD = 
1.07) showed lower positive attitudes toward Blacks than intrinsic (M = 5.47, SD = 
.85), indiscriminant (M = 5.33, SD = 5.33, SD = .79) and low religiosity (M = 5.36, 
SD = 5.36). While this study replicates the relationship between intrinsic and 
extrinsic religiosity, it failed to replicate the finding of Allport and Ross (1967) that 
indiscriminant religiosity was more prejudiced than intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity.  
Discrepancy Scores 
Within the dissociation framework, discrepancy scores represent a difference 
between what individuals report they should do and what they actually would do. The 
higher the discrepancy score, the greater the violation of what participants believed 
they should do. Placed within a TMT framework, discrepancy scores represent 
violations of CWV. If an individual’s CWV contains a commitment to “the 
brotherhood of believers” (Allport, 1954, p. 444), as in the case of religion, then 
failure to live up to that standard reduces self-esteem and therefore reduces the 
buffering effects of death anxiety.  
According to TMT, MS should cause individuals to rely more on their CWV. 
However, in doing so, TMT also suggests they might feel threatened by different 
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others. Allport and Ross (1967) found that intrinsic religiosity worked toward the 
reduction of prejudice.  If Allport is correct, the death prime would lead intrinsics to 
cling to their religious belief (increase should) and live out their religious belief 
(would). If intrinsics were more concerned with appearing less racist than with 
actually being less racist then the death prime should lead them to claim less racism 
(decreased should scores) but would show an increase in racist actions (increased 
would).  
H1a and H1b each predicted movement of should and would  scores to reveal 
either a genuine concern for prejudice reduction (H1: lower should and lower would 
scores) or a concern to appear less racist (H2: lower should and higher would scores).   
Though means moved in the direction of H1a, results showed no significant 
difference in should or would scores between the death and dental groups. 
Interestingly, an independent samples t-test showed the total discrepancy score 
(should – would) for intrinsics was lower in the death condition (M = .68, SD = .72) 
than in the dental condition (M = .83, SD = .67) though the result only approached 
significance, t(165) = .18, p = .09. A lower discrepancy score in the death condition 
may suggest mortality salience leads intrinsics to respond more consistently between 
belief and practice when it comes to prejudicial treatment of others. If such were the 
case, it might indicate that intrinsic religiosity has a genuine concern for prejudice 
reduction.   
The lack of significant findings may be due to the inconsistencies between 
proximal and distal defense noted above such that participants remained in proximal 
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defense mode and therefore showed no significant difference in reaction. A second 
explanation is also possible. It could be that intrinsic religiosity is a reasonably stable 
form of religiosity such that priming death does not significantly alter what a person 
should or would do. If intrinsic religiosity represents the prominent role of religion in 
a person’s life, then one might expect a level of consistency regardless of death 
thought awareness.  
Discrepancy represents the difference between stated belief and action. If MS 
leads individuals to cling to their CWV, then a genuine belief in prejudice reduction 
would lead to a reduction in discrepancy. H2 predicted intrinsic religiosity would 
have lower discrepancy scores than extrinsic, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in 
the same MS condition. Results in the death condition failed to support this 
prediction.  
As noted previously, this lack of significance between MS conditions may be 
due to inconsistencies in the study design such that participants did not enter proximal 
defense. Failure to enter proximal defense would mean participants still had death in 
their focal awareness and therefore employed more conscious forms of coping with 
death thoughts such as rationalizing away the threat of death.  
 Another possibility may be that on the issue of race, the CWVs of the 
religious and low-religiosity are similar in their anti-prejudiced view such that a death 
prime causes them to retain the same underlying anti-prejudice concept, but for 
difference reasons. A religious person and a low/non-religious person may both 
believe in the concept of “love your neighbor” but come to this conclusion for 
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different reasons. In this case, a death prime would lead them both to adhere to a 
similar anti-racism perspective.  
Results for H2 in the dental condition did show a significant difference 
between intrinsic (M = .83, SD = .67) and low religiosity (M = .41, SD = .52), and 
approached significance between intrinsic and indiscriminant (M = .54, SD = .54), p = 
.08. Similarly, intrinsic discrepancy scores were higher than extrinsic discrepancy 
scores, though statistically non-significant. These findings are opposite of the 
hypothesized direction and warrant further examination. 
While discrepancy scores failed to show a significant difference across 
religiosities, the two mechanisms that make up the discrepancy scores (should and 
would) reveal notable differences. An ANOVA using religiosity (intrinsic, extrinsic, 
indiscriminant, and low religiosity) as a grouping variable and should scores as the 
dependent variable yielded a significant result, F(3, 174) = 5.89, p = .001. Moreover, 
Bonferroni post hoc analysis showed intrinsics reported marginally lower should (M 
= 1.90, SD = .67) scores than extrinsics (M = 2.53. SD = 1.34), p =.06, and extrinsics 
reported marginally higher should scores than indiscriminant (M = 1.71, SD = .76), p 
= .06.  
An ANOVA using would scores as the dependent variable likewise revealed 
significant differences between religiosity, F (3,174) = 4.73, p = .005. Bonferroni 
post hoc analysis revealed extrinsic would scores (N = 15, M = 3.60, SD = 1.64) to be 
significantly higher than indiscriminant (N = 16, M = 2.39, SD = .88) and low 
religiosity (N= 61, M = 2.63, SD = 1.09).  Additionally, while an independent samples 
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t-test revealed non-significant results between discrepancy scores in the death and 
dental conditions, it is interesting to note that discrepancy scores were higher for 
extrinsic, quest, indiscriminant, and low religiosity in the death condition but moved 
in the opposite direction for intrinsics such that intrinsic discrepancy scores were 
lower in the death condition (see Table 2).  
These findings, being opposite the predicted direction, could be due to a 
number of possibilities. First, higher discrepancy scores for intrinsics may support 
Batson and Burris’ claim that intrinsic religiosity “reached only to the hand that 
marks the questionnaire, not to the heart” (Batson & Burris, 1994, p. 152). What 
intrinsics say they should do is not what they would do. Instead, they treat people of 
differing race worse than their religious claims dictate they should. However, 
significant differences in should and would scores, along with the different pattern of 
movement between discrepancy scores in the death and dental conditions, raise the 
possibility of another explanation.  
 If intrinsics were more concerned with appearing less racist than actually 
being less racist (Batson & Burris, 1994) one would expect them to minimize the 
discrepancy between what they should do and what they would do. This does not 
appear to be the case since intrinsic discrepancy scores actually increased.  It is also 
important to note that intrinsics reported statistically lower should and would scores 
than extrinsics. Under MS, intrinsics report that they should show lower levels of 
prejudice and that they would demonstrate lower levels of prejudice. This movement 
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may suggest that MS leads intrinsics to genuinely show less prejudice beliefs and 
reported actions even though the discrepancy between the two increases as noted.  
That increased discrepancy scores may indicate genuine concern to reduce 
prejudice finds some support in the findings of H3 which predicted a negative 
correlation between social desirability and discrepancy. As predicted, the more 
concern individuals have for social appearance the more they might minimize any 
difference between stated beliefs and actions as demonstrated by reduced discrepancy 
scores. 
 Batson’s position that intrinsics were more concerned with appearance is 
based, in part, on findings that intrinsics reported higher levels of social desirability 
than extrinsics (Batson et al., 1974). Taken together, the increased discrepancy scores 
for intrinsics in H2 and the negative correlation between social desirability and 
discrepancy in H3, suggests that intrinsic religiosity may be more than simply trying 
to appear less prejudiced. In fact, when Batson’s concept of quest religiosity is 
included, an ANOVA comparing social desirability means across religiosity for this 
study yielded no significant difference with quest religiosity showing no significant 
difference in social desirability scores than intrinsic or extrinsic religiosity,  F(3, 441) 
= 1.89, p = .13.  
Since Batson et al. (1974) believed quest religiosity to be more stable and less 
susceptible to social desirability concerns, it was important to compare levels of 
discrepancy scores in light of the findings in H3. H4 predicted quest religiosity would 
report lower scores on discrepancy than all other religious orientations, thus 
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overcoming the deficiencies of intrinsic religiosity and social desirability. Results for 
H4 failed to show lower discrepancy scores for quest. While MS showed a non-
significant effect on discrepancy scores, a significant difference was found among 
religiosity such that quest (M = .75, SD = .06) and intrinsic (M = .76, SD = .05) 
reported higher discrepancy scores than low religiosity (M = .46, SD = .11). As with 
H2, this trend is opposite of the predicted means.  
Since social desirability and discrepancy scores are negatively correlated as 
shown in H3, increased discrepancy scores may indicate the opposite of social 
desirability. Instead of trying to minimize any discrepancy between belief and action, 
higher discrepancy scores may be a genuine acknowledgement of a failure to live up 
to stated beliefs. To this end, Batson’s claim that quest religiosity was more stable 
than intrinsic religiosity was not supported in this study. Rather, intrinsic and quest 
religiosity function similarly in their level of consistency between stated belief and 
stated action when it comes to issues of race.  
Compunction 
Compunction is the feeling of shame and guilt that results from the 
acknowledgement that you have failed to do what your CWV dictates you should. 
Since intrinsic and quest religiosity are theoretically more central to a person’s 
identity (Allport & Ross, 1967, Batson et al., 1974), it was predicted that violations 
would lead to greater levels of compunction. Consistent with previous research 
(Devine, 1989; Devine et al., 1991; Monteith et al., 1993), results of the present study 
indicate a positive correlation between discrepancy scores and compunction, r(475) = 
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.25, p = .0001. However, contrary to prediction, feelings of compunction appear to be 
experienced equally regardless of religiosity. H5a predicted intrinsics would 
experience higher levels of compunction in the dental condition than in the death 
condition. However, as discussed with the previous hypothesis, the lack of significant 
difference in discrepancy scores between death and dental conditions, coupled with 
non-significantly lower discrepancy scores in the death condition, provide a plausible 
explanation for the lack of significant findings for H5. That is to say, since intrinsic 
discrepancy scores did not increase in the death condition, one might not expect 
compunction scores to increase either. Failure to find support for H5a in the death 
condition may go back to the previously mentioned issue of proximal and distal 
defenses.  
H5b and H6 likewise predicted intrinsics (H5b) or quests (H6) would 
experience higher levels of compunction than the other religiosities. No support was 
found for either H5b or H6. Failure to support H5b and H6 may suggest violations of 
any CWV leave individuals vulnerable to the emotional effects of discrepancy 
regardless of the nature of their worldview. Feelings of compunction appear to be 
determined by the level of discrepancy rather than the nature of religiosity such that a 
violation is a violation, regardless of what is being violated. Therefore, evidence 
suggests the level of dissonance experienced when stated belief and stated action 
differ leads to compunction regardless of the underlying nature of the CWV.  
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Death Anxiety  
 TMT posits that CWVs work to buffer the terror of death. Self-esteem derives 
from individuals’ ability to live up to the standards of their CWV. Therefore, as long 
as people live up to their CWV, the terror of death will be buffered. If discrepancy 
scores represent an acknowledged failure to live up to the beliefs of a CWV, then 
increased discrepancy scores should result in increased levels of death anxiety, as 
predicted in H7. This was supported with the significant findings of H7 showing a 
positive correlation between discrepancy means and death anxiety. When self-
reported non-prejudiced values are violated, the buffering effects of the CWV are 
diminished. A worldview only buffers death anxiety to the degree to which it is 
adhered.  
As was the case with compunction, the impact of discrepancy on death 
anxiety transcends religiosity. Both H8 and H9 predicted either intrinsic religiosity 
(H8) or quest religiosity (H9) would experience greater levels of death anxiety than 
the other religiosities given that violations of the CWV are theoretically more central 
to a person’s identity.  This proved not to be the case. The lack of significant findings 
for H8 and H9 further suggests violations of CWV remove some degree of anxiety 
buffering effectiveness regardless of the nature of the CWV. No matter one’s level of 
religious commitment, violations of any CWV decrease the buffering effects of the 
CWV, leaving the person more vulnerable to death anxiety. Failure to live up to any 
CWV results in decreased death anxiety buffering regardless of the CWV’s ability to 
buffer the anxiety.  
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Research Questions 
The lack of significant findings for all three research questions may be 
attributed to at least one of two factors. First, it may be that the strength of the primes 
failed to sufficiently activate the various components of one or more orientations. For 
instance, indiscriminants received a mixture of intrinsic and extrinsic messages based 
on similarly high scores on two or more orientations. Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) 
found a personal and a social dimension to extrinsic religiosity and Batson and 
Schoenrade’s (1991) quest scale measures three elements to quest. Priming these 
orientations may be more complex than the priming method used in the current study.  
A second possibility is that giving all participants the opportunity to indicate 
agreement with any religious statement, regardless of relevance to their particular 
orientation, allowed them to affirm their religious/non-religious identity. This 
explanation would be consistent with past TMT research which primed general 
religiosity by allowing participants to affirm general religious beliefs through a scale 
or statement (Friedman & Rhodes, 2007; Goldenberg et al., 2009; Rothchild, 
Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009). Rather than priming a particular religiosity, the 
ability to affirm any orientation might actually activate the relevant religious 
orientation in that person. In doing so the religious components of a person’s CWV 
would then be primed. However, since every participant received some form of 
religious orientation prime in the present study, this explanation does not seem 
testable.    
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Limitations 
It is important to note three limitations to the present study. First, the low 
number of participants in the extrinsic (N = 32) and indiscriminant (N = 33) 
orientations may have contributed to underpowered tests of the hypothesis including 
these variables, particularly when these orientations were divided by MS condition. 
An a priori power analysis noted previously revealed a need for N = 104 per group 
using an ANOVA and N = 70 per group using an ANCOVA to find a small effect 
size with 80% power. For hypotheses in this study using ANOVA and ANCOVA 
procedures, the number of participants left these tests underpowered.  Future studies 
should seek to increase the number of participants in these cells to improve statistical 
power. 
A related limitation concerns the nature of the two populations used in this 
study. As expected, Christian university participants reported significantly higher 
levels of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity, following patterns observed by 
Donahue (1985). MTURK participants reported higher levels of atheism and 
agnosticism. Future research should focus on a more balanced population that would 
ideally have roughly equal numbers of individuals within each orientation—or at least 
a minimally sufficient number within each orientation.     
A third limitation involves the TMT aspects of the current study. Two issues 
may have contributed to the lack of significant MS effects for some hypotheses. As 
noted previously, the current study did not include a mechanism to monitor the timing 
of MS prime and delay, potentially resulting in participants remaining in proximal 
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defense. Future research should include a way to control for this important element 
when using an online survey instrument. Although the current study sought to address 
this issue by using paper/pencil materials for the university students in a more 
controlled lab setting, using such a controlled administration of the MS manipulation 
for all subjects would likely ensure more reliable results across all conditions.   
Future Research  
The present study also lays the groundwork for future research in a number of 
interesting areas. First, given the correlation between discrepancy and death anxiety, 
future research should attempt to manipulate levels of discrepancy to investigate a 
more substantial causal claim. For instance, discrepancy scores could be manipulated 
to give participants the perception of either higher or lower levels of worldview 
violation. Similarly, discrepancy scores could be framed according to how others 
performed on the same measure. If participants believed they performed better than 
their colleagues then the effects of increased discrepancy might be moderated by self-
monitoring cues.   
A second line of research could investigate the effects of priming religious 
orientation. As noted in the research questions above, the ability to compare primed 
religious thought with non-religious thought primes could clarify whether general 
religious primes serve to boost religiosity or whether the prime should be more 
specifically tailored to the participant’s orientation. Since intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
quest religiosity contain unique elements, religious orientation primes should be 
developed that more effectively tap into these elements. Since an indiscriminant 
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orientation is made up of a generally positive assessment of religion, the prime should 
focus on religion in general rather than elements of intrinsic, extrinsic, or quest 
religiosity.  
Additionally, the difference between Black and non-Black discrepancy scores 
is an important area for future research. For this study Blacks reported negative 
discrepancy scores which resulted from increased should scores. Higher should scores 
would suggest Blacks believed higher levels of prejudice were appropriate toward 
Whites. This raises interesting questions concerning the way prejudice works between 
different racial subgroups. Even with the present questions raised by altering should 
and would measures for use among Black participants, the suggestion that portraying 
Whites as the oppressed minority provides justification for increased prejudice 
deserves further investigation. Likewise, the ability to measure the role of religiosity 
with Black should  and would scores might offer further insight into the function of 
religiosity as it relates to issues of minority treatment.  
Finally, future research should investigate whether racial perspectives based 
on religious or non-religious worldviews function differently for participants. 
Participants could be primed to think of race through a legal perspective or religious 
teachings through either reading or writing an argument against racism. Similarly, 
Allport’s notion of a sociocultural influence wherein religion serves “double duty” 
(Allport, 1954, p. 446) provides a third alternative. Combining religion and national 
identity, as is often done in modern American culture, may provide a CWV made up 
of both religious and social justifications for identification and treatment of outgroups 
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in particular ways.  It may be participants are more motivated by a religious call to 
“love your neighbor” than by a civil call of “justice for all”. It may also be 
participants are equally compelled by both.  
 Conclusions  
Despite some equivocal findings, the present study provides useful insights 
into the three main concepts used in the design of this research. First, correlations 
between discrepancy and death anxiety provide support for the underlying 
assumptions of TMT. Cultural worldviews are only effective at reducing death 
anxiety when their values are lived out in a person’s life. TMT argues that self-esteem 
is derived from living up to the dictates of a chosen CWV. If CWVs help buffer the 
anxiety of death when adhered to, then failure to live up to one’s CWV results in an 
increase in death anxiety. Discrepancy scores represent the degree to which 
participants self-reported their failure to follow the non-prejudiced standards of their 
CWV. Consistent with TMT, increased discrepancy resulted in increased death 
anxiety.  
Second, Allport’s (1954) notion of compunction and Devine’s dissociation 
model (1986) positing compunction (guilt/shame) as a result of violating personal 
beliefs found support in the present study. This too lends support to TMT. If CWVs 
provide comfort and equanimity to life, violating CWV standards results in shame, 
guilt, and personal discomfort. The findings that compunction was equal across 
religious orientation strengthen the TMT claim that CWVs in general function to 
provide comfort, not just a certain few. As noted above, these feelings of 
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compunction are correlated with the violation of any religious orientation/CWV and 
are not unique to just one religious orientation. Failure to adhere to any non-
prejudiced standard led to increased levels of compunction.  
Finally, Batson et al.’s (1974) depiction of intrinsic religiosity as being more 
committed to the appearance of decreased racism than to actual decreased racism 
appears to be a slight over-assertion within this study. The present study did not 
replicate Batson’s findings showing intrinsics with significantly higher means for 
social desirability. Rather, social desirability means were equal across religiosity. To 
the extent that discrepancy might represent the opposite of social desirability, 
intrinsics were not statistically different from quest religiosity. Similarly, Allport’s 
claims that intrinsic religiosity is more effective at decreasing racism was found to 
gain only modest support in this study. The non-significant findings between 
intrinsics and other religiosities suggest it functions the same in regards to racism.  
51 years after Dr. King’s observation of Sunday morning prejudice, the 
prejudice issue continues to be at work in American culture, even within American 
religion. Despite the passage of Civil Rights legislation, the integration of education, 
and the election of the first Black president, American culture continues its struggle to 
break the prejudice habit. This study addressed the role of religion as it relates to 
prejudice. Future research should continue to investigate the paradoxical relationship 
between religion and racism as well as other cultural worldviews seeking to address 
prejudice.  
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Appendix A: Phase 1 Materials  
Demographic Measures  
 
1. Please indicate your gender 
Male  
Female 
 
2. Please indicate your age  ____ 
 
3. Please indicate your educational level 
Freshman 
Sophomore  
Junior  
Senior   
Graduate Student  
College graduate 
 No college  
 
4. Please choose the option that most closely matches your race/ethnicity 
Black 
White 
Asian/Pacific Islander 
American Indian/Alaskan Native 
Hispanic 
Middle Eastern 
Other 
 
5. Affiliation 
University participant 
Other 
MTURK Participant 
 
 6.  Which of the following best describes your religious convictions? 
    Muslim 
    Jew 
   Christian 
   Eastern Religion 
   Agnostic 
   Atheist  
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Appedix A (cont.) 
 
7.  How often do you participate in a religious service?  
Never 
Less than once a month 
Once a month 
2-3 times a month 
Once a week 
2-3 times a week 
Daily  
 
8.  Which of the following statements best represents your religious experience as a 
child? 
 I grew up in a religious environment 
 I grew up in a semi-religious environment  
 I grew up in a non-religious environment  
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Appendix A (cont.) 
Whites’ Attitude Toward Black  
Note: All items are scored on a 7-point range from 1=strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. 
1. If a black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction 
from him or her.  
2. If I had a chance to introduce black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would 
be pleased to do so.  
3. I would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in. (Rev) 
4. I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black in a public 
place. (Rev) 
5. I would not mind it at all if a black family with about the same income and 
education as me moved in next door. 
6. I think that black people look more similar to each other than white people do. 
(Rev) 
7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” confusion 
which the children feel. (Rev) 
8. I get very upset when I hear a white make a prejudicial remark about blacks.  
9. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods. 
10. It would not bother me if my new roommate was black.  
11. It is likely that blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in. 
(Rev) 
12. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. (Rev) 
13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices 
blacks suffer at the hands of local authorities.  
14. Black and white people are inherently equal. 
15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights. 
(Rev) 
16. Whites should support blacks in their struggle against discrimination and 
segregation.  
17. Generally, blacks are no as smart as whites. (Rev) 
18. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a 
promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members. 
(Rev) 
19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefited both 
whites and blacks.  
20. Some blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them.   
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Appendix A (cont.) 
Black’s Attitude Toward Whites  
Note: All items are scored on a 7-point range from 1=strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree. 
1. Most whites feel that blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal 
rights. (Rev) 
2. I feel that black people’s troubles in the past have built in them a stronger 
character than white people have. 
3. Most whites can’t be trusted to deal honestly with blacks. (Rev) 
4. Over the past few years, blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve. 
(Rev) 
5. Most whites can’t understand what it’s like to be black. (Rev) 
6. Some whites are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them. 
(Rev) 
7. I would rather not have whites live in the same apartment building I live in. (Rev) 
8. I would accept an invitation to a New Year’s Eve Party given by a white couple in 
their own home. 
9. It would not bother me if my new roommate was white. 
10. Racial integration (of schools, business, residences, etc.) has benefitted both 
whites and blacks. 
11. It’s not right to ask Americans to accept integration if they honestly don’t believe 
in it. (Rev) 
12. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods. 
13. Most whites fear that blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they 
move in. (Rev) 
14. By and large, I think blacks are better athletes than whites. (Rev) 
15. Local city officials often pay less attention to a request or complaint from a black 
person than from a white person. (Rev) 
16. When I see an interracial couple I feel that they are making a mistake in dating 
each other. (Rev) 
17. I have as much respect for whites as I do for some blacks, but the average white 
person and I share little in common. (Rev) 
18. I think that white people look more similar to each other than black people do. 
(Rev) 
19. Whites should support blacks in their struggle against discrimination and 
segregation. 
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20. If a white were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction 
from him or her.   
107 
 
Appendix A (cont.) 
Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) and External 
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS) 
Instructions: The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people 
might have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people. Some 
of the reasons reflect internal-personal motivations whereas others reflect more 
external-social motivations. Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and 
external reasons; we want to emphasize that neither type of motivation is by 
definition better than the other.  
In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual 
responses. All your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying 
to get an idea of the types of motivations that students in general have for responding 
in nonprejudiced ways. If we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you 
respond to each of the questions openly and honestly. Please give your response 
according to the scale below. 
External motivation items 
1. Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced 
toward Black people. 
2. I try to hide any negative thoughts about Black people in order to avoid negative 
reactions from others. 
3. If I acted prejudiced toward Black people, I would be concerned that others would 
be angry with me. 
4. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward Black people in order to avoid 
disapproval from others.  
5. I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others. 
 Internal motivation items 
1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is 
personally important to me. 
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about Black people is OK. 
(Rev) 
3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward Black 
people. 
4. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about Black 
people is wrong. 
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Appendix A (cont.) 
 
5. Being nonprejudiced toward Black people is important to my self-concept.  
Note. (R) Indicates reverse coded item.  
Participants rated 10 items on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 
(strongly agree). When participants complete the scales, the IMS and EMS items are 
intermixed. The factor loadings are from an exploratory factor analysis.   
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Internal Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (IMS) and External 
Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice Scale (EMS) (Blacks) 
Instructions: The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might 
have for trying to respond in nonprejudiced ways toward White people. Some of the reasons 
reflect internal-personal motivations whereas others reflect more external-social motivations. 
Of course, people may be motivated for both internal and external reasons; we want to 
emphasize that neither type of motivation is by definition better than the other.  
In addition, we want to be clear that we are not evaluating you or your individual responses. 
All your responses will be completely confidential. We are simply trying to get an idea of the 
types of motivations that students in general have for responding in nonprejudiced ways. If 
we are to learn anything useful, it is important that you respond to each of the questions 
openly and honestly. Please give your response according to the scale below. 
External motivation items 
1. Because of today's PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear nonprejudiced 
toward White people. 
2. I try to hide any negative thoughts about White people in order to avoid negative 
reactions from others. 
3. If I acted prejudiced toward White people, I would be concerned that others would be 
angry with me. 
4. I attempt to appear nonprejudiced toward White people in order to avoid disapproval 
from others.  
5. I try to act nonprejudiced toward White people because of pressure from others. 
 Internal motivation items 
1. I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward White people because it is personally 
important to me. 
2. According to my personal values, using stereotypes about White people is OK. (Rev) 
3. I am personally motivated by my beliefs to be nonprejudiced toward White people. 
4. Because of my personal values, I believe that using stereotypes about White people is 
wrong. 
5. Being nonprejudiced toward White people is important to my self-concept.  
Note. (R) Indicates reverse coded item.  
Participants rated 10 items on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly 
agree). When participants complete the scales, the IMS and EMS items are intermixed. The 
factor loadings are from an exploratory factor analysis.  
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The Marlow-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Personal Reaction Inventory  
 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each 
item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you personally. 
 
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. (T) 
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. (T) 
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. (F) 
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. (T) 
5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. (F)  
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way. (F) 
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. (T) 
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. (T) 
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do 
it. (F), 
10. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I thought too little of my 
ability. (F) 
11. I like to gossip at times. (F) 
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right. (F)  
13. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener. (T) 
14. I can remember "playing sick" to get out of something. (F) 
15. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone. (F) 
16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. (T) 
17. I always try to practice what I preach. (T) 
18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get along with loud mouthed, obnoxious people. (T) 
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. (F) 
20. When I don't know something I don't at all mind admitting it. (T) 
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. (T) 
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. (F)  
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. (F) 
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. (T) 
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor. (T) 
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. (T) 
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. (T) 
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. (F) 
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. (T) 
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. (F) 
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause. (T) 
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. (F) 
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings. (T) 
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Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scales 
 
All items are scored as follows:  
 
1= strongly disagree 
2 = I tend to disagree 
3 =I am not sure 
4= I tend to agree 
5=I strongly agree  
 
Intrinsic 
1. I enjoy reading about my religion.  
2. It doesn’t much matter what I believe so long as I am good. (rev) 
3. It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer. 
4. I have often had a strong sense of God’s presence. 
5. I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs.  
6. Although I am religious, I don’t let it affect my daily life. (rev) 
7. My whole approach to life is based on my religion.  
8. Although I believe in my religion, many other things are important in life (rev) 
 
 
 
Extrinsic  
1. I go to church because it helps me to make friends (Es) 
2. I pray mainly to gain relief and protection. (Ep) 
3. What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow. (Ep) 
4. Prayer is for peace and happiness. (Ep) 
5. I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends. (Es) 
6. I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there. (Es) 
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12-Item Quest Scale 
All items are scored on a 5-point range from 1=strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. 
Readiness to face existential questions without reducing their complexity 
1. I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the 
meaning and purpose of my life.  
2. I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the 
tensions in my world and in my relation to my world. (rev) 
3. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.  
4. God wasn’t very important for me until I began to ask questions about the 
meaning of my own life.  
Self-criticism and perception of religious doubt as positive. 
5. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties. 
6. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious.  
7. I find religious doubts upsetting. (rev) 
8. Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.  
Openness to change  
9. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.  
10. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.  
11.  I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years. (rev)  
12. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.  
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Religious Orientation Feedback  
Intrinsic 
The role that religion plays in one’s life differs from person to person. One may take the 
position that religion is the most important guide for how they live their life. SUh a 
person sees religion as the master motive to their life and tries to live their life 
accordingly.  
Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion. 
Not like me at all 1 
Not much like me 2 
Somewhat like me 3 
Quite a lot like me 4 
Just like me  5 
Extrinsic 
The role that religion plays in one’s life different from person to person. One may take 
the position that religion is one of the guides for how they live their life. Such a person 
sees religion as a means of gaining peace, security, and social connections in their life.  
Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion. 
Not like me at all 1 
Not much like me 2 
Somewhat like me 3 
Quite a lot like me 4 
Just like me  5 
  
 Quest  
The role that religion plays in one’s life differs from person to person. One may take the 
position that religion is a search for truth in the face of life’s questions. Such a person 
sees religion as an open-ended and changing search for truth, which may never be 
completely achieved.  
Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion. 
Not like me at all 1 
Not much like me 2 
Somewhat like me 3 
Quite a lot like me 4 
Just like me  5 
  
 
114 
 
Appendix B (cont.) 
Indiscriminant 
The role that religion plays in one’s life differs from person to person. One may take the 
position that religion serves as a foundation to life while also believing there are other 
important things. Such a person sees religion as a guide and means to peace, security, 
and social connections.  
Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion. 
Not like me at all 1 
Not much like me 2 
Somewhat like me 3 
Quite a lot like me 4 
Just like me  5 
  
Non-Religious  
The role that religion plays in one’s life differs from person to person. One may take the 
position that religion does not play a significant role in how they live their life. Such a 
person sees religion as insignificant to their own pursuit of peace, security, social 
connections and meaning.  
Please indicate the degree to which the statement above describes your view of religion. 
Not like me at all 1 
Not much like me 2 
Somewhat like me 3 
Quite a lot like me 4 
Just like me  5 
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Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
 
Instructions 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please 
indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement using the following 
responses:  
 
Strongly Disagree Agree  Disagree Strongly Disagree 
 
1. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
2. At times I think I am no good at all. 
3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
6. I certainly feel useless at times. 
7. I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
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The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality appraisal. 
Recent research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life tell 
us a considerable amount about the individual’s personality. Your responses to this 
survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your 
personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF 
YOUR OWN DEATH AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
HAPPENS TO YOU AS YOU PHYSICALLY DIE AND ONCE YOU ARE 
PHYSICALLY DEAD. 
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
  
117 
 
Appendix B (cont.) 
 
 
The Projective Life Attitudes Assessment 
 
This assessment is a recently developed, innovative personality appraisal. 
Recent research suggests that feelings and attitudes about significant aspects of life 
tell us a considerable amount about the individual’s personality. Your responses to 
this survey will be content-analyzed in order to assess certain dimensions of your 
personality. Your honest responses to the following questions will be appreciated. 
 
1. PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE THE EMOTIONS THAT THE THOUGHT OF 
GOING TO THE DENTIST AROUSES IN YOU. 
 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. JOT DOWN, AS SPECIFICALLY AS YOU CAN, WHAT YOU THINK 
HAPPENS TO YOU AS YOU ARE AT THE DENTIST OFFICE AND ONCE YOU 
EXPERIENCE DENTAL PAIN.  
 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________ 
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PANAS 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate to what extent each word describes your feelings at this time. Use the following 
scale to record your answers. 
 
1 =Very slightly or not at all 
2 =A little 
3=Moderately 
4 =Quite a bit 
5 = Extremely\ 
 
 
_____ interested _____irritable 
_____ distressed _____alert 
_____excited _____ashamed 
_____ upset _____inspired  
_____strong _____nervous 
_____guilty _____ determined 
_____scared _____ attentive  
_____ hostile _____ jittery 
_____ enthusiastic _____ active  
_____ proud _____ afraid  
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Growing Stone – Distractor Task  
 
The personality portion of the survey is over. Now, we would like you to 
complete a few different attitude tasks. As was stated earlier, research suggests that 
attitudes and perceptions about even very common everyday items may be related to 
basic personality characteristics. To further examine this idea, we would like you to 
complete the opinion questionnaires on the following pages with your most natural 
response. Please follow the instructions provided and complete the questionnaires in the 
order they are presented. That is, do not skip around. 
 
Please read the following short passage from a novel and answer the questions 
below it. 
 The automobile swung clumsily around the curve in the red sandstone trail, now 
a mass of mud. The headlights suddenly picked out in the night—first on one side of the 
road, then on the other—two wooden huts with sheet metal roofs. On the right near the 
second one, a tower of course beams could be made out in the light fog. From the top of 
the tower a metal cable, invisible at its starting-point, shone as it sloped down into the 
light from the car before disappearing behind the embankment that blocked the road. 
The car slowed down and stopped a few yards from the huts. 
 The man who emerged from the seat to the right of the driver labored to 
extricate himself from the car. As he stood up, his huge, broad frame lurched a little. In 
the shadow beside the car, solidly planted on the ground and weighed down by fatigue, 
he seemed to be listening to the idling motor. Then he walked in the direction of the 
embankment and entered the cone of light from the headlights. He stopped at the top of 
the slope, his broad back outlined against the darkness. After a moment he turned 
around. In the light from the dashboard he could see the chauffeur’s black face, smiling. 
The man signaled and the chauffeur turned of the motor. At once a vast cool silence fell 
over the trail and the forest. Then the sound of the water could be heard. 
 The man looked at the river below him, visible soley as a broad dark motion 
flecked with occasional shimmers. A denser motionless darkness, far beyond, must be 
the other bank. By looking fixedly, however, one could see on that still bank a 
yellowish light like an oil lamp in the distance. The big man turned back toward the car 
and nodded. The chauffeur switched off the lights, turned them on again, then blinked 
them regularly. On the embankment the man appeared and disappeared, taller and more 
massive each time he came back to life. Suddenly, on the other bank of the river, a 
lantern held up by an invisible arm back and forth several times. At a final signal from 
the lookout, the man disappeared into the night. With the lights out, the river was 
shining intermittently. On each side of the road, the dark masses of forest foliage stood 
out against the sky and seemed very near. The fine rain that had soaked the trail  
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an hour earlier was still hovering in the warm air, intensifying the silence and 
immobility of this broad clearing in the virgin forest. In the black sky misty stars 
flickered.  
 
How do you feel about the overall descriptive qualities of the story? 
 
        1      2      3       4      5       6        7        8       9 
not at all                   somewhat                       very 
descriptive               descriptive                descriptive 
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Word Completion Task 
We are simply pre-testing this questionnaire for future studies. Please complete the 
following by filling letters in the blanks to create words. Please fill in the blanks with 
the first word that comes to mind. Write one letter per blank. Some words may be 
plural. Thank you. 
 
 
1. BUR _ _ D      14. CHA _ _ 
2. PLA _ _      15. KI _ _ ED 
3. _ _ OK      16. CL _ _ K 
4. WAT _ _      17. TAB _ _  
5. DE _ _      18. W _ _ DOW 
6. MU _ _      19. SK _ _ L 
7. _ _ NG      20. TR _ _  
8. B _ T _ LE      21. P _ P _ R 
9. M_ J _ R      22. COFF _ _ 
10. P _ _ TURE     23. _ O _ SE 
11. FL _ W _ R     24. POST _ _ 
12. GRA _ _      25. R _ DI _ 
13. K _ _GS 
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Authenticity of Self-Reported Discrepancies  
Should-Would Discrepancy Questionnaire 
Should Instructions. This questionnaire concerns people's reactions to Blacks. We are 
not interested in evaluating any single individual, so you can be sure that your answers 
will be kept completely anonymous. For us to learn anything from this study, we ask 
that you respond openly and honestly, and that you read the instructions for each part of 
the questionnaire very carefully. 
The following items concern your beliefs about Blacks. We would like you to respond 
to the following items based on the beliefs that you hold, regardless of whether the way 
you actually act is always consistent with those beliefs. Please record a number in the 
space provided in front of each item that best reflects how much you agree or do not 
agree with each statement. Use " 1 " to indicate strong disagreement, " 7 " to indicate 
strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate intermediate levels of 
agreement. 
Should (belief) items  
1. I should go out of my way to avoid passing a Black person on the street. (14) 
2. I think that Blacks and Whites should have an equal opportunity to be hired by 
an employer. (R) (7) 
3. I believe that I should not think of Blacks in stereotypical ways. (R) (1) 
4. I believe that interracial couples should be regarded the same as any other 
couple. ( R ) (11) 
5. If I had a Black classmate, I should assume that he/she is just as capable of 
completing intellectually challenging tasks as my White classmates. (R) (9) 
6. I support Blacks in their struggle against discrimination. (R) (16) 
7. I should react to all supervisors the same, regardless of their race. (R) (6) 
8. I believe that I should never avoid interacting with someone just because he/ she 
is Black. (R) (5) 
9. I should not feel uncomfortable about having a Black roommate. (R) (13) 
10. I should not feel uncomfortable in the company of Black people. (R) (3) 
11. I do not believe that my neighborhood should be open to Black families. (4) 
12. I do not believe that Black men typically have criminal tendencies. (R) (10) 
13. I should not feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a Black person. (R)  (8) 
14. I believe Black students study as hard as White students. (R) (15) 
15. I believe that, even if an interracial couple wants to marry, they should not do it. 
(2) 
16. I believe that laughing at jokes that play on the stereotype of Blacks is wrong. 
(R) (12)   
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Would Instructions. Sometimes the way we actually respond in a situation is consistent 
with our beliefs, and other times we find ourselves acting in a way that is inconsistent 
with our beliefs. For each item below, we are interested in your initial, gut-level 
reactions, which may or may not be consistent with how you believe you should react. 
Please record a number in the space provided in front of each item that best reflects how 
much you agree or do not agree with each statement. Use “1” to indicate strong 
disagreement, “7 “to indicate strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate 
intermediate levels of agreement.  
I -Would item 
1. I sometimes have stereotypical racial thoughts.  
2. I would not be upset if a member of my family married someone of a different 
race. (R)  
3. I would feel uncomfortable if I were the only White person in a group of Black 
people. 
4. I would not be troubled if a Black family moved into my neighborhood. (R) 
5. On occasion, I have avoided interactions with people because they were Black. 
6. I would feel awkward having a Black supervisor. 
7. If I were an employer, I would initially hesitate to hire someone who was Black. 
8. I would feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a Black person. 
9. If I were choosing a classmate to complete a difficult in-class assignment with 
me, I would be more likely to choose a White than a Black classmate. 
10. If I saw a Black man walking toward me on an empty street, I would feel 
worried about his intentions. 
11. Seeing interracial couples doing things together makes me uncomfortable. 
12. I sometimes laugh at jokes that play on the stereotype of Blacks. 
13. I would feel uncomfortable if I was assigned a Black roommate. 
14. If I were walking alone down the street and saw a Black person walking toward 
me, I would not consider crossing to the other side of the street. (R) 
15. I would initially assume that a Black student does not take school as seriously as 
a White student. 
16. I feel irritated when Blacks claim they've been discriminated against. 
 
Note. (R) = reverse-scored. Numbers in parentheses following should items represent 
the corresponding would Item.  
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Authenticity of Self-Reported Discrepancies (Blacks) 
Should-Would Discrepancy Questionnaire 
Should Instructions. This questionnaire concerns people's reactions to Whites. We are 
not interested in evaluating any single individual, so you can be sure that your answers 
will be kept completely anonymous. For us to learn anything from this study, we ask 
that you respond openly and honestly, and that you read the instructions for each part of 
the questionnaire very carefully. 
The following items concern your beliefs about Whites. We would like you to respond 
to the following items based on the beliefs that you hold, regardless of whether the way 
you actually act is always consistent with those beliefs. Please record a number in the 
space provided in front of each item that best reflects how much you agree or do not 
agree with each statement. Use "” 1" to indicate strong disagreement, “7”  to indicate 
strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate intermediate levels of 
agreement. 
Should (belief) items  
1. I should go out of my way to avoid passing a White person on the street. (14) 
2. I think that Whites and Blacks should have an equal opportunity to be hired by 
an employer. (R) (7) 
3. I believe that I should not think of whites in stereotypical ways. (R) (1) 
4. I believe that interracial couples should be regarded the same as any other 
couple. ( R) (11) 
5. If I had a white classmate, I should assume that he/she is just as capable of 
completing intellectually challenging tasks as my Black classmates. (R) (9) 
6. I support Whites in their struggle against discrimination. (R) (16) 
7. I should react to all supervisors the same, regardless of their race. (R) (6) 
8. I believe that I should never avoid interacting with someone just because he/ she 
is White. (R) (5) 
9. I should not feel uncomfortable about having a White roommate. (R) (13) 
10. I should not feel uncomfortable in the company of White people. (R) (3) 
11. I do not believe that my neighborhood should be open to White families. (4) 
12. I do not believe that White men typically have criminal tendencies. (R) (10) 
13. I should not feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a White person. (R)  (8) 
14. I believe White students study as hard as Black students. (R) (15) 
15. I believe that, even if an interracial couple wants to marry, they should not do it. 
(2) 
16. I believe that laughing at jokes that play on the stereotype of Whites is wrong. 
(R) (12)  
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Would Instructions. Sometimes the way we actually respond in a situation is consistent 
with our beliefs, and other times we find ourselves acting in a way that is inconsistent 
with our beliefs. For each item below, we are interested in your initial, gut-level 
reactions, which may or may not be consistent with how you believe you should react. 
Please record a number in the space provided in front of each item that best reflects how 
much you agree or do not agree with each statement. Use “1” to indicate strong 
disagreement, “7 “to indicate strong agreement, and intermediate numbers to indicate 
intermediate levels of agreement.  
I -Would item 
1. I sometimes have stereotypical racial thoughts.  
2. I would not be upset if a member of my family married someone of a different 
race. (R)  
3. I would feel uncomfortable if I were the only Black person in a group of White 
people. 
4. I would not be troubled if a white family moved into my neighborhood. (R) 
5. On occasion, I have avoided interactions with people because they were White. 
6. I would feel awkward having a White supervisor. 
7. If I were an employer, I would initially hesitate to hire someone who was White. 
8. I would feel uncomfortable shaking the hand of a White person. 
9. If I were choosing a classmate to complete a difficult in-class assignment with 
me, I would be more likely to choose a Black than a White classmate. 
10. If I saw a White man walking toward me on an empty street, I would feel 
worried about his intentions. 
11. Seeing interracial couples doing things together makes me uncomfortable. 
12. I sometimes laugh at jokes that play on the stereotype of Whites. 
13. I would feel uncomfortable if I was assigned a White roommate. 
14. If I were walking alone down the street and saw a White person walking toward 
me, I would not consider crossing to the other side of the street. (R) 
15. I would initially assume that a White student does not take school as seriously as 
a Black student. 
16. I feel irritated when Whites claim they've been discriminated against. 
 
Note. (R) = reverse-scored. Numbers in parentheses following should items represent 
the corresponding would Item.  
 
 
  
126 
 
Appendix B (cont.)  
Compunction Affect Indices  
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. 
Indicate to what extent each word describes your feelings at this time. Use the following 
scale to record your answers. 
 
1 (does not apply at all)  to  7 (applies very much) 
 
Discomfort Index  
 _____ Bothered 
_____ Uneasy 
_____ Uncomfortable 
 
 Negself  
 _____ Disappointed with myself 
_____ Guilty 
_____ Annoyed at myself 
_____ Self-critical  
  
Positive  
 _____ Friendly 
_____ Good 
_____ Happy 
_____ Optimistic 
 Depressed  
 _____ Low 
_____ Sad 
_____ Depressed 
 
 Negother  
 _____ Irritated at others  
_____ Disgusted with others 
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State Shame and Guilt Scale (SSGS) 
The following are some statements which may or may not describe how you are feeling 
right now. Please rate each statement using the 10-point scale below. Remember to rate 
each statement based on how you are feeling right at this moments.  
Note feeling this  Feeling this way  Feeling this way 
at all.    somewhat.   very strongly.  
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
1. I feel good about myself. 
2. I want to sink into the floor and disappear. 
3. I feel remorse, regret. 
4. I feel worthwhile, valuable. 
5. I feel small. 
6. I feel tension about something I have done.  
7. I feel capable, useful. 
8. I feel like I am a bad person.  
9. I cannot stop thinking about something bad I have done.  
10. I feel proud.  
11. I feel humiliated, disgraced. 
12. I feel like apologizing, confessing.  
13. I feel pleased about something I have done.  
14. I feel worthless, powerless.  
15. I feel bad about something I have done.  
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15-Item Templer Death Anxiety Scale  
 Directions: After reading each of the following states, please mark “True” if the 
statement is true or mostly true as it pertains to you, or “False” if the statement is 
false or mostly false.  
 
1. I am very much afraid to die. 
2. The thought of death seldom enters my mind. 
3. It doesn't make me nervous when people talk about death. 
4. I dread to think about having to have an operation. 
5. I am not at all afraid to die. 
6. I am not particularly afraid of getting cancer. 
7. The thought of death never bothers me. 
8. I am often distressed by the way time flies so very rapidly. 
9. I fear of dying a painful death. 
10. The subject of life after death troubles me greatly. 
11. I am really scared of having a heart attack. 
12. I often think about how short life really is. 
13. I shudder when I hear people talking about World War III. 
14. The sight of a dead body is horrifying to me. 
15. I feel the future holds nothing for me to fear. 
 
